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Tax as Corporate Governance Ally
by David M. Schizer1
Please consult author before citing this working draft of November 7,
1999. Comments are welcome at (212) 854-2599 or dschiz@law.columbia.edu.
In the capital markets, the 1990s have been the decade of executive stock
options and the derivatives market. Legal scholars and economists have begun to
realize that, in combination, these two trends raise a serious concern. Options
are supposed to inspire better performance by tying pay to the stock price. Yet,
what if an executive could use the derivatives market to simulate a sale of her
option – a practice known as “hedging” – without violating her contract with the
firm? The incentive justification for option grants would no longer hold.
This Article demonstrates that the tax law helps avert this consequence in
the United States; this phenomenon, in turn, shows that the U.S. tax law performs
an important corporate governance function, not previously recognized in the
academic literature. The tax law discourages executives from hedging options
(but not necessarily from hedging stock holdings, although such hedging raises
somewhat different concerns). Whereas shareholders and executives should
contract to ban options hedging, the existing tax barrier is a plausible substitute.
Indeed, since the tax law already has reason to monitor and penalize hedging, it
can perform this corporate governance function without significant new
administrative costs. Yet the tax barrier is overbroad and potentially unstable.
Indeed, it could unravel due to relatively minor changes in the tax law that seem
far removed from corporate governance. Moreover, the tax barrier does not
govern foreign executives who are not subject to U.S. tax. Accordingly, this
Article recommends strengthening contractual and securities law constraints on
hedging. It concludes with reflections about the capacity of tax to influence
corporate governance, not only for the worse, as has widely been observed, but
also sometimes for the better.
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In the capital markets, the 1990s have been the decade of executive stock
options and the derivatives market. Enormous option grants have raised executive
pay to staggering new heights, while intensifying its sensitivity to firm stock
prices.2 Growth of the derivatives market has been comparably dramatic.3 Simply
put, derivatives are financial bets, which might be about interest rates, a particular
stock price, etc.4 Some derivatives, such as options, have been around for many
years; indeed, executive stock options are derivatives. In contrast, “equity swaps”
are relatively new.5 In recent years, moreover, finding a counterparty has become
much easier. Trillions of dollars of derivatives transactions are now outstanding
and the volume is constantly growing.6

2

See, e.g., John Helyar & Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Coffers Gush With
Currency of an Opulent Age, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B1, B4 (calling stock
options “the ultimate 90’s status symbol” and noting that “the U.S. Treasury might
consider a new motto for the old-fashioned money it mints: In Options We
Trust”). In 1998, the five best compensated CEOs split $1.2 billion. Jennifer
Reingold & Ronald Grover, Executive Pay: Special Report, Bus. Wk., April 19,
1999, at 73; see also id. at 74 (noting that exercised options made up 80% of the
average CEOs pay package, up from 72% in 1997). The trend also extends to
executives below the CEO rank. Tom Leander, Raking in the Cash, Global Fin.,
Aug. 1998, at 16 (noting 83.81% increase in compensation of 76 surveyed CFOs
from 1996 to 1997, with the increase largely attributable to options).
3

See, e.g., Robert M. McLaughlin, Over the Counter Derivatives Products
xvii (1999) (noting that CFO magazine described 1994 as “Year of Derivatives”);
Kevin M. Keyes, Federal Taxation of Financial Instruments and Transactions, at v.
(1997) (“The recent growth in the number and variety of financial products and
transactions has been astonishing.”).
4

See Group of Thirty, Global Derivatives Study 28 (1993) [hereinafter, G30 Study] (“In the most general terms, a derivatives transaction is a bilateral
contract or payments exchange agreement whose value derives, as its name
implies, from the value of an underlying asset or underlying reference rate or
index.”).
5

See Richard Reinhold, Tax Issues in Equity Swap Transactions, 57 Tax
Notes 1185 (Nov. 23, 1992); Keyes, supra note 3, at 14-3 (swaps “have, to put it
simply, revolutionized the financial markets”).
6

See Paula Froelich, OTC Derivatives Are Popular With Investors,
Profitable For Brokers, Wall St. J., July 26, 1999, at B8H (“There is one hot
product area that seems to be thriving regardless of the market’s fate: over-thecounter equity derivatives.”); Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O’Brien, Financiers
Plan to Put Controls on Derivatives, New York Times, Jan. 7, 1999, at C1, C3
(noting that $37 trillion worth of privately traded derivatives contracts are
(continued...)
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Legal scholars and economists have begun to realize that, in combination,
these two trends raise a serious concern.7 Options are supposed to inspire better

6

(...continued)
outstanding, compared to only $865 billion in 1987).
7

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities and Corporate
Governance, 2 Alternative Forms of Organization 99, 100-01(draft of June 3,
1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (cautioning that managers
could use derivatives to”liberate their compensation from the firm’s performance,”
so that “both financial and governance devices can be defeated by this maneuver”).
But cf. id. (noting that the derivatives market can have favorable corporate
governance implications as well, such as in allowing market pricing of governance
terms to work more efficiently). See also Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking
Stock: Does Equity-Based Compensation Increase Managers’ Ownership? N.Y.U.
Working Paper (November 1997) (noting that estimate of selling by executives “is
likely to be underinclusive . . . [because] [i]n recent years derivative securities
dealers have developed many ways for managers to realize value from their equity
holdings without having to “sell” their shares in a legal sense . . .”). Robert Dean
Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 Hous.
L. Rev. 399, 402-3 (1998) (warning that executives can “defease” incentive
compensation with derivatives); Steven Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives
Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DePaul Bus. L.J. 301 (1995) (“The real
problem with the trend toward stock-based compensation and the assumption that
it will properly reward and motivate executives lies in the rapid development of
new financial products in the booming derivatives market.”). See also Share
Options, Economist, Aug. 7th, 1999, at 18, 20 (describing derivatives as a route to
“escap[ing] restrictions on exercising or selling their share options”); Paul Bolster
et al., Executive Equity Swaps and Corporate Insider Holdings, 25 Fin. Man. 14
(1996) (describing insider’s use of equity swap to hedge Autotote stock); J. Carr
Bettis et al., Insider Trading in Derivative Securities: An Empirical Examination of
the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, Arizona
State University Working Paper (testing frequency of stock hedging by insiders
and discussing its corporate governance implications); Rick Antle & Abbie Smith,
An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate
Executives 24 J. Accounting Rsch 1, 6 (1986) (cautioning that conventional
economic analysis of optimal incentive contracts is potentially flawed because the
models do not account for “the effects of an executive’s ability to hedge the risk of
ownership of shares in his firm’s employment”). Cf. Chip Heath et al.,
Psychological Factors and Stock Option by derivatives for insider trading and
evasion of section 16(b)); Karl Shumpei Okamato, Oversimplification and the
SEC’s Treatment of Derivative Securities by Corporate Insiders, 1993 Wis. L.
Rev. 1287 (1993).
2

performance by tying pay to the stock price.8 Because the underlying theory no
longer holds if the executive sells the option, firms ban sales by contract.9 Once a
specified “vesting” period has elapsed, firms allow executives to exercise the
option and sell the stock; by this time, though, new unvested grants are supposed
to preserve the desired incentive.10 Yet what if an executive could use the
derivatives market to simulate a sale of her options (included unvested ones) – a
practice I call “hedging” – without violating her contract? The incentive
justification for option grants would no longer hold. Nor could the market (or
academic commentators) ascertain an executive’s true level of ownership if she did
not disclose the hedge. In addition, debates about refining incentives would lose
their urgency. For example, even if executives should be rewarded for
outperforming competitors or the market as a whole, rather than for absolute
increases in stock price,11 an option’s structure would not matter if executives
could simply undo it with derivatives.
This Article demonstrates that the tax law helps avert these consequences
in the United States;12 this phenomenon, in turn, shows that the U.S. tax law

8

See Part I.C.1, infra.

9

See Part II.A, infra.

10

New unvested options could also increase an executive’s exposure,
instead of merely preserving it. Yet executives can avoid an increase by exercising
vested options and then selling the stock received. See Ofek & Yermack, supra
note 7. Although Professors Ofek and Yermack describe such behavior as
“hedging,” see id., this Article refers to such behavior as “exercise.” As used here,
“hedging” refers instead to a separate derivatives transaction whose return cancels
out the return from option holdings. For example, an executive would sell to a
derivatives dealer an option like the one received as salary. She would keep the
sales proceeds. Thereafter, any pre-tax gain (or loss) on the hedge would offset
any pre-tax loss (or gain) on the salary option. See Part I.B (explaining how
options hedging would work, if not for tax and other constraints).
11

See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J.
Econ. 74 (1979) (compensation contracts should filter out industry and market
risk); Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance Evaluation for
Chief Executive Officers 43 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 30-S (same) (1990); Geoffrey
S. Rehnert, Note, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentive to
Reduce Agency Costs, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1147 (1985) (advocating indexed
options).
12

In contrast, some of the articles cited in note 7, supra, have erroneously
suggested that options hedging is feasible. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 7, at
100-01; Ellis, supra note 7, at 402-3 (1998); Bank, supra note 7, 12, at 301;
(continued...)
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performs an important corporate governance function, not previously recognized
in the academic literature. Quite to the contrary; conventional wisdom has it that
U.S. tax law impedes corporate governance, or at least pursues governance
objectives ineffectively.13 This Article offers a significant counterexample (albeit
an ironic one, since Congress did not intend the relevant tax rules to address
corporate governance). First, the tax law discourages (but does not necessarily
prevent) executives from exercising vested options and selling the stock. Second,
and more importantly, the tax law generally prevents executives from hedging
options. The reason is that hedging could trigger a sizeable tax even when the
executive has no pretax profit, because deductions for hedging losses are of limited
value, if available at all.14 As a result, firms and shareholders can be confident that,
12

(...continued)
Antle & Smith, supra note 7 , at 6.
13

The double tax on corporate profits is said to insulate executives from
capital market discipline by favoring reinvestment of earnings, see Jennifer H.
Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 Yale
L.J. 325 (1995); James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax
Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697
(1997), and the deductibility of interest is said to discourage corporate innovation.
See Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction
Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1461 (1993). Scholars
have criticized tax penalties for greenmail and golden parachutes, as well as tax
preferences for certain compensation. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail,
Golden Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of
Sections 280G, 4999 and 5881, 35 Vill. L. Rev. 131, 132 (1990) (“As a matter of
tax policy, the Code provisions pertaining to greenmail and golden parachutes . . .
are not defensible additions to the tax law.”); Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role
of the Federal Tax Law In Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeover Defenses: The
New Section 5881 Excise Tax On Greenmail, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 789, 828 (1988)
(concluding that “the use of the tax law to discourage greenmail is not justified
from a tax policy perspective”); Kurt Hartmann, The Market for Corporate
Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for Corporate Control
Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DePaul Bus. L.J. 159 (1994) (criticizing use of
federal tax system to regulate market for takeovers); Susan J. Stabile, Is There A
Role For Tax Law In Policing Executive Compensation, 72 St. Johns L. Rev. 81,
94, 98 (1998) (arguing that “compensation is a matter for the market and private
parties and not one requiring government involvement”); Maya Alexandri, Who
Should Decide the Level of CEO Compensation? Tax Notes, November 30, 1998
(arguing that, although the market for executive compensation is failing, section
162(m) is a flawed solution).
14

As discussed in Part IV.B., deductions for hedging losses may be deferred
indefinitely for two reasons: first, hedging losses usually are capital, and thus
(continued...)
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as long as an option has not been exercised, it offers the executive unhedged
exposure.
However, the same cannot be said of an executive’s stock holdings
(whether acquired through a market purchase or through exercise of an option).
The same tax penalties do not operate, and so stock hedging does occur.15 To an
extent, though, stock hedging does not raise the same concerns; executive stock
ownership does not breed unambiguously good incentives and is less likely to be
the subject of a bargain with shareholders.16
As for options hedging, the tax law is not the only constraint. A subset of
firms do limit hedging by contract. More commonly, contractual bans on pledging
options increase the transaction costs of hedging. In addition, Section 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act requires the most senior executives, so-called “insiders,”
to disclose certain hedges and, in some cases, makes hedging illegal. Yet less
senior executives, who still may have sizeable option grants, are not affected by
these constraints, and even insiders may be able to sidestep them with subtler
hedging strategies (such as derivatives based on a “basket” of stocks whose value
tracks the employer’s stock price).17 The tax law fills these gaps.
Although it is preferable to refine these contractual and securities law
limits, the tax barrier is a plausible substitute. Because the U.S. tax law already
has reason to monitor and penalize hedging, it can perform this corporate
governance function without significant new administrative costs. Yet the tax
14

(...continued)
cannot offset ordinary income from the option; second, the hedge and option
would be a “straddle” under section 1092, and straddle losses are potentially
subject to deferral. Even when available, the deduction is insufficiently generous,
as discussed in Part IV.C. An extra dollar of hedging loss reduces tax by less than
an extra dollar of hedging gains increases it. The gain generates 39.6 cents in tax
(since this capital gain is short-term under the straddle rules), whereas the loss
reduces tax by only 20 cents (since it typically reduces long-term capital gains).
As a result, the hedge cannot leave the executive indifferent, after taxes, to
changes in the stock price; she will have losses either as the stock price rises or as
it falls.
15

For a case study, see Bolster et al., supra note 7, at 20 (describing
Autotote swap). Indeed, the hedging identified in the Bettis study, supra note 7,
are also stock hedges. See Letter from Bettis to Schizer (noting that hedges
identified in study are of stock, rather than options) (on file with Columbia Law
Review).
16

See infra Part I.C.5.

17

For a discussion, see infra Part I.B. & Part II.B.
5

barrier has the disadvantages of inflexibility and instability. It punishes options
hedging strategies that shareholders might favor,18 along with those they would
not. Moreover, the barrier could unravel due to relatively minor changes in the tax
law that seem unrelated to corporate governance. Indeed, as we shall see, a July
1999 proposal by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, if
enacted, would largely undo the tax barrier upon taking effect in 2008.19 In
addition, the tax barrier applies only to U.S. taxpayers. Although stock options
have been used mostly by U.S. firms (i.e., for executives who are subject to U.S.
tax), foreign firms are beginning to use options.20 Export of this U.S.
compensation practice is inappropriate, though, unless foreign executives are
constrained from hedging, a function the U.S. tax law usually will not serve.
Accordingly, this Article makes three recommendations. First, every firm
should restrict options hedging by contract. Second, the U.S. securities law limits
on options hedging should be clarified and expanded, and analogous regimes
should be adopted in other jurisdictions. Finally, the favorable current U.S. tax
and accounting treatment for options (i.e., tax deductible but not an accounting
expense) should either be repealed or limited to firms with effective anti-hedging
policies.
After describing stock options and the mechanics of hedging, Part I
considers the social costs of options hedging and explains its attraction to
18

As discussed in Part I.C.1, executive hedging that screens out risk of
broad market movements, while leaving the executive with firm-specific risk, may
be favored by shareholders. Executives would in effect synthesize the market
adjusted options discussed in supra note 11. Put another way, the tax law
“overfills” a gap in the securities laws – its neglect of basket hedges – by blocking
“good” basket hedges, along with “bad” ones.
19

Chairman Archer has proposed to repeal the alternative minimum tax
beginning in 2008, a step that would significantly reduce the tax burden on hedging
with swaps. For a discussion, see infra Part IV.D.1.
20

See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, American-Style Pay Moves Abroad, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 3, 1998, at C1 (noting globalization of options as compensation);
Leslie Chang, Chinese Firms Find Incentive to Use Stock-Compensation Plans,
Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A42 (Chinese firms are beginning to offer option
grants). Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation 7-8 (April 1998) (unpublished
manuscript) (noting that use of options once was uncommon outside the United
States, but in recent years “interest in stock options is exploding . . . in the Pacific
Rim and in Europe and Latin America”); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for
Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative
Corporate Governance Debate, 91 N.W. U. L. Rev. 865, 890 (1997) (in Japan,
legal prohibitions on options were recently lifted, and firms are beginning to offer
options).
6

executives. Part II describes existing contractual and securities-law constraints on
hedging. Parts III and IV show the way tax law fills in gaps in these constraints.
In particular, Part III describes the way the tax law discourages (but does not
prevent) executives from exercising options, and Part IV shows the tax law’s more
punitive treatment of options hedging. Part V considers advantages and
disadvantages of relying on the tax law for such functions. Part VI offers some
recommendations. Finally, after considering the Article’s implications for the
literature on stock options, derivatives and comparative corporate governance,
Part VII concludes with reflections about the capacity of tax to influence corporate
governance, not only for the worse, as has widely been observed, but also
sometimes for the better.
I. HEDGING AND THE AGENCY PROBLEM
This Part describes executive stock options and how, if not for tax and
other barriers, executives could hedge them with derivatives. This Part then
explains why shareholders will not want an executive to hedge and why she may be
tempted to do so anyway.
A. Executive Stock Options and the Traditional Exit Strategy:
Exercising the Option and Selling the Stock
An executive stock option entitles the executive to buy some number of
shares from her employer at a specified price (the “exercise price”) on or before
the “maturity” date.21 For example, this “call” option may permit the executive to
buy 10,000 shares for $10 at any time in the next ten years.
An option is a valuable right -- indeed, it is valuable even if the stock has
not risen above the exercise price. The option allows the executive to choose to
buy the stock at $10 (i.e., if it is trading above $10) but does not obligate her to do
so (i.e., if it is trading below $10). This choice has value in offering unlimited
opportunity for gain (as the stock rises above $10) with limited risk of loss. If the
stock price fall to zero, the executive loses only what she paid for the option (the
so-called “premium”) which, for the executive, is the cash salary she gave up to get
it. In addition, an option is valuable in sparing the holder from committing capital,
since the option costs less than the underlying stock. Given these two advantages,
an option has value, known as “time value,” beyond its so-called intrinsic value
(i.e., the amount the holder can earn by exercising it on a given day).22

21

For a description, see Arthur H. Kroll, Compensating Executives 41-43
(1998) (describing typical option). Such options to buy are known as “call”
options. In contrast, options to sell are called “put” options.
22

Robert W. Kolb, Financial Derivatives 91 (2d ed. 1996) (noting that
(continued...)
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Since the option will appreciate with the stock price, an executive who
holds one should have an incentive to perform well, and thus to drive up the stock
price. Of course, executives will not want to hold an option indefinitely;
eventually, they will want to spend their gains or, perhaps, to diversify by investing
in something else. Recognizing this reality, firms allow executives to “cash out” by
exercising the option (that is, tendering the exercise price in return for stock) and
then selling the stock received. Yet to preserve the executive’s incentive, firms
take two steps. First, they prevent an executive from exercising the option until a
specified “vesting” period has elapsed. For example, the vesting period might be
four years, with one-quarter of the grant vesting each year.23 Second, firms can
monitor the number of unexercised options and, if it falls below the desired level,
they can adjust subsequent pay accordingly (e.g., by offering relatively less cash
and more options and by lengthening the vesting period of new grants).
Exercise is relatively easy exit strategy for firms to police. Since the firm is
the counterparty on the option, executives cannot exercise it – that is, they can’t
use it to get stock at a below-market price – without the firm’s consent and
knowledge.24 Likewise, the executive cannot sell the option without the firm’s
consent; no one would buy it because the firm might refuse to honor it if tendered
by someone else. In addition, exercise carries a built-in economic penalty that
could deter executives from taking this step; exercising the option extinguishes its
time value. Put another way, if an executive has an option to buy stock at $10 and
the stock is trading at $50, the option is worth more than the $40 she could get by
exercising it and selling the stock. Before it is exercised, an option also offers the
time-value advantages, described above, of retaining use of the exercise price and
not putting it at risk.25
22

(...continued)
options have value in excess of intrinsic value).
23

For example, the executive who received an option on 10,000 shares
might be allowed to exercise a maximum of 2,500 in the first year, and then the
same number in the second, third, and fourth years.
24

Firms will not necessarily know that the executive has sold the stock,
absent disclosure. Yet the disclosure obligation for sales of stock is clear. In
addition, firms should probably assume that executives are selling the stock
received upon exercise. As discussed below, if the executive wishes to remain
exposed to the stock, there is an economic incentive to do it through the option
(i.e., its time value). Empirically, it is also very common for executives to sell
stock received upon exercise. Heath, supra note 7, at 606 (“[T]he great majority
of option-holders immediately sell the stock acquired on exercise. . . .”).
25

As discussed below, firms should also prefer exercise as an exit strategy
because it triggers their tax deduction, while hedging does not. There is also a tax
(continued...)
8

B. Hedging as an Alternative Exit Strategy: Illustrative Examples
If not for the tax and other barriers discussed below, the derivatives market
would offer executives a new exit strategy, hedging, that does not share these
advantages to the firm. In a hedging transaction, the executive would enter into a
formally separate transaction whose return would cancel out the return on the
option; for example, she might sell an option with the same exercise price as the
one she received from her firm. Just like exercise, then, hedging offers cash
proceeds and insulation from changes in the option’s value.
However, the firm has less control over this exit strategy. Whereas
exercise of the option is a transaction with the firm, hedging is a transaction with a
third party such as a derivatives dealer. Thus, the firm’s participation (and
consent) are no longer inherently necessary. Although the firm ought to negotiate
for contractual limits on hedging, we shall see that such provisions are relatively
uncommon.26 Indeed, absent some other constraint, executives could hedge
unvested options, even though they could not exercise them. Nor will the firm
know the executive is “exiting” in this way unless she discloses this information; as
we shall see, disclosure obligations are somewhat porous under current law.27 In
addition, hedging does not require the executive to forgo the option’s time value,
as does exercise. Just as selling the option would not extinguish its time value –
since the new holder would have benefit of this time value and thus would pay the
seller for it – hedging can also preserve the time value, since it involves sale of a
comparable option.
The mechanics of hedging can best be illustrated with examples. Before
we turn to them, two caveats are in order. First, although existing contractual
limitations and disclosure requirements are insufficient to deter all options hedging,
other constraints (including, notably, the tax law) are likely to achieve this goal.
The following examples assume away these constraints. Second, whereas the
hedged asset in these examples is an option, the mechanics for hedging stock
holdings are similar. As we shall see, executives remain relatively free to hedge
stock holdings, since the tax and other barriers to options hedging apply to stock
hedging with considerably less force, if at all. To an extent, however, such
hedging does not raise the same concerns.28

25

(...continued)
disincentive to exercise, although there is an even greater tax disincentive to
hedge. For a discussion, see infra Parts III & IV.
26

See infra Part II.A.

27

See infra Part II.B.1.

28

For a discussion, see infra Part I.C.5.
9

To see the mechanics of options hedging, assume that on January 1, 2000,
an executive receives a ten-year option (the “Compensatory Option”) to buy
10,000 shares of her employer’s stock at its January 1, 2000 price of $10. The
options are worth $30,000 when granted. This amount derives solely from the
option’s time value, since the stock price is not higher than the exercise price. By
contract, the executive can never sell the Compensatory Option and cannot
exercise it until it “vests” on January 1, 2003.
To hedge immediately, the executive would sell a comparable call option
(the “Market Option”) to a derivatives dealer (the “Dealer”). This strategy would
yield an immediate cash payment of $30,000, attributable to the Market Option’s
time value. As shown on Table 1, the returns on the Market and Compensatory
Options would always cancel out, netting to $30,000 (e.g., whether the stock price
fell to $5 or rose to $25.)
TABLE 1: RETURN FROM IMMEDIATE HEDGE
Maturity Stock
Price

Return on Compensatory Option

Return on Market
Option

Net Return

5

029

30,00030

30,000

25

150,00031

(120,000)32

30,000

Alternatively, the executive could wait for the Compensatory Option to
appreciate before hedging it. Assume that on January 1, 2001, a year after the
Compensatory Option was granted, the Stock has soared from $10 to $100. The
Compensatory Option is now worth at least $900,000.

29

The return would be zero because the Compensatory Option’s $10
exercise price exceeds the $5 market price, and so the option would expire
worthless.
30

The return on the Market Option would be the $30,000 proceeds from
selling it. The executive would make no payments to the holder of the Market
Option, since it would expire worthless.
31

Since the stock price has risen $15 above the $10 exercise price, the
executive would earn $15 per option or $150,000.
32

The executive would be forced to sell stock to the holder of the Market
Option for $10 (or $100,000), even though it is worth $25 per share (or
$250,000). She thus would lose $150,000 upon exercise, which is offset by the
$30,000 proceeds from selling the Market Option. Her net loss would be
$120,000.
10

To lock in past gains without surrendering the right to future gains, the
executive would buy the right to sell 10,000 shares for $100 per share in two
years. This “put option” would guarantee a $900,000 spread on the
Compensatory Option, even if the stock price fell.33 Yet the put would not
obligate her to sell at $100 (e.g., if the stock price rises to $200). This flexibility is
expensive. The cost of the put (e.g., $300,000) would reduce her guaranteed
return (e.g., from $900,000 to $600,000).34
To avoid this expense, the executive could pay for the put by giving her
counterparty a call option, instead of cash. In a so-called “collar,” she would buy a
put (that would protect her past gains) and would sell a call (that would transfer
future gain to the counterparty). For example, the put might let her sell the stock
at $100 and the call might let her counterparty buy the stock from her at $120. As
Table 2 shows, the collar would lock in a minimum gain of $90 per share or
$900,000 (since the executive could always sell the stock for at least $100);
likewise, the collar would limit the potential profit to $110 per share (since the
counterparty would buy the stock for $120 if it were trading higher).35
TABLE 2: RETURN FROM POST-APPRECIATION HEDGE
Maturity
Stock Price

Gain on
Compensatory Option

Change From
Initial Gain of
$900,000

Return on
Hedge

Net Return

40

300,000

(600,000)

600,000

900,000

200

1,900,000

1,000,000

(800,000)

1,100,000

As we shall see, in some cases the derivatives described above would
trigger contractual bans or disclosure requirements. To avoid these constraints
(but, as we shall see, not the tax constraint), executives could use derivatives
33

If the stock is trading at $40 in January 1, 2003, she could use the
Compensatory Option to buy it for $10 with her Compensatory Option and then
sell it for $100 with the put, thereby netting $90 per share, or $900,000.
34

Given this significant expense, this hedging strategy is not popular even
when tax and other barriers are absent. Cf. Zurack, supra note 71, at 7 Tbl. 8
(noting as “concern” about put-based hedging strategy that “[u]p-front cost usually
[is] higher than collar”).
35

Thus, if the stock fell to $40, she would buy it for $10 with her
Compensatory Option and resell it for $100 with her put, leaving her a $90 per
share profit (or $900,000). If instead the stock were trading at $200, again she
would buy it for $10 and resell it for the $120 she committed to pay on the short
call. As a result, her profit would be $110 per share (or $1.1 million).
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based, not on the employer’s stock, but on a group (or “basket”) of stocks whose
value tracks the employer’s stock price.36 For example, an executive at an oil
company (“OilCo”) could use a collar on a basket of oil stocks, on the theory that
all oil stocks respond similarly to changed market conditions.37 Yet, although it is
a hedge against industry or market-wide declines, the basket would offer less
protection from firm-specific risk (which might, in fact, be of greatest concern to
the undiversified executive). For example, if OilCo caused an oil spill but the rest
of the industry were prospering, the executive could lose money on both the OilCo
option and the hedge.38 To avoid this scenario, the executive could represent
OilCo disproportionately in the basket. Yet her argument for not disclosing the
hedge would become considerably more aggressive.39
C. Social Cost of Hedging Stock Options
Now that we have surveyed the mechanics of hedging, this Section
describes three social costs raised by options hedging and then explains why
options hedging can raise more serious concerns than two other exit strategies:
exercise of the option and sale of the stock, and hedging stock holdings.
1. Incentive Effects
36

See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal
Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 37,260, reprinted in 61 Fed. Reg.
30376, 30387 (June 14, 1996) (“[N]o Section 16 consequences would flow from
an equity swap to the extent that the equity swap relates solely to interests in
securities comprising part of a broad-based, publicly traded market basket or index
of stocks . . . .”).
37

For the returns to track, they should be positively correlated and have
comparable volatilities. The most commonly used standard, “tracking error,”
equals the square root of the sum of the variances minus twice the covariance. See
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Global Equity and Derivatives Markets 4 (June 6,
1997).
38

See Zurack, supra note 71, at 7 (expressing concern about “tracking”

risk).
39

Interview with George Spera, Shearman & Sterling (authority not to
disclose refers to “broad-based” indices that have been approved for trading). See
SEC Rule 16a–1(a)(5)(iii) (“The following interests are deemed not to confer
beneficial ownership for purposes of Section 16 of the Act . . . . Interests in
securities comprising part of a broad-based, publicly traded market basket or index
of stocks, approved for trading by the appropriate governmental authority.”); SEC
Rule 16a–1(c)(4) (excluding from definition of derivative security “interests in
broad-based index futures, and broad-based publicly traded market baskets of
stocks approved for trading by the appropriate federal governmental authority”).
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The usual justification for option grants in both academia and the markets
is to align the incentives of management and shareholders.40 Options also may
increase an executive’s appetite for risk, an effect that diversified shareholders
typically value because they usually are more risk-tolerant than undiversified
managers.41 Once sold or hedged, however, an option no longer motivates an
executive because it no longer ties her personal wealth to the stock price.

40

See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin.
Econ. 305 (1976) (proposing equity compensation as substitute for shareholder
monitoring); see also, e.g., David Yermack, Do Corporations Award CEO Stock
Options Effectively, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 237, 243 (1995) (noting that options are
supposed to reduce agency costs). See Richard DeFusco et al., The Effect of
Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. Fin. 617,
617 (1990) (“Improved incentives are the reason most often cited by firms seeking
shareholder approval for the adoption of stock option plans.”). An option’s
incentive effects are borne out by some, but not all, empirical literature. For
example, firms that pay relatively more of the CEO’s compensation in equity tend
to be have higher returns. See Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure,
Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. Fin. Econ. 163, 169, 176-78 (1995)
(higher Tobin’s q and higher return on assets). Robert T. Masson, Executive
Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 Journal of
Political Economy 1278 (1971) (higher share price). Cf. John J. McConnell &
Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, 27
J. Fin. Econ. 595, 603-9 (1990) (corporate performance improves as
management’s stock ownership rises from 0 to 40%, but declines beyond 40%).
For a current survey of the literature, see Murphy, supra note 20, at 41-44
(“Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that stock-based
incentives are important drivers of managerial actions and corporate performance.
There remains little direct evidence, however, on the returns a company can expect
from introducing aggressive performance-based compensation plans. The evidence
is, at best, suggestive. . . .”). For studies that question the effectiveness of options,
see Ellis, supra note 7 (offering citations).
41

Option holders favor risk because their return is asymmetric: they share
fully in gains but not in losses. See Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law
and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 249 (2d ed. 1995) (describing asymmetric
return of options and noting their utility as compensation for risk-averse
managers).
In contrast, an adverse incentive effect of options is that they may
discourage managers from paying dividends (assuming the option payoff is not
adjusted for dividends). See Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Compensation: The Most
Expensive Way to Pay future Cash, 52 SMU L. Rev. 423, 442 (1999); cf. Murphy,
supra note 20, at 17 (some options offer dividend adjustments).
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Whereas this concern applies to hedges that replicate sales (e.g., single
stock hedging and basket hedging where the employer’s stock is
disproportionately represented), it does not apply to hedges that screen out
industry or market risk but not firm-specific risk (e.g., a “genuine” basket hedge).
Such a hedge is a bet that the employer will outperform the industry or market – a
bet that, if anything, should intensify an executive’s motivation. The executive is,
in effect, synthesizing a “market adjusted” option.42
2. Transparency and Transactions Costs
The case against hedging is strongest if options create useful incentives.
Yet even if they do not, it is better for the firm not to give options in the first place
than for executives to alter the bargain unilaterally.43 Hedging imposes significant
transactions costs on the executive. Moreover, to the extent that hedging can be
done secretly with third parties, boards and shareholders are less able to defend
their interests.44 Only the executive knows her “true” pay. Without this
information, it is harder for firms to craft optimal compensation contracts and for
shareholders to evaluate the firm.
As long as firms can substitute other types of pay, there is no social need
for hedging even if options constitute inefficient compensation. In fact, firms can
offer a host of alternatives.45 Nor must the firm give options, as opposed to other
“performance based” pay (such as bonuses based on earnings), in order to claim a
tax deduction.46

42

According to economists, these options offer better incentive effects than
conventional options. See sources cited in note 11, supra.
43

Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1474 (1989) (“[A]gents whose interests may materially
diverge from the interests of their principals should not have the power to
unilaterally determine or materially vary the rules that govern those divergences of
interests.”).
44

See infra Part II.B.1 (noting that noninsiders are not obligated to disclose
hedges and insiders do not have to disclose basket hedges). To the extent
disclosure obligations are improved, as recommended by this Article, this concern
is diminished.
45

See generally Kroll, supra note 21 (discussing various methods of
compensation).
46

Under Section 162(m), annual compensation above $1 million generally is
not deductible unless it is “performance based,” a category that includes options
but is not limited to them. For a discussion, see infra Part III.A.2.
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Admittedly, though, the favorable accounting treatment cannot be
duplicated (i.e., certain options never cause expense on the income statement).47
To the extent the accounting rules induce overuse of options48 – including overuse
of a particular type of option49 – hedging might be justified as a “second best” way
to undo these distortions. Even so, it would be better to fix the accounting rule.
Since this regime already imposes information costs by understating compensation
expense, it may prove unwise to “correct” its distortions with a practice, hedging,
that would exacerbate these information costs. Even absent accounting reform,
moreover, the costs of overusing options (such as unnecessary risk premiums that
firms might pay to managers) arguably are preferable to the transaction and
information costs of hedging.
3. Pareto Superior Compensation Contracts
In undermining the transparency of compensation contracts, hedging can
adversely affect the executive, as well as the firm and shareholders. An executive
usually wants a premium to accept options instead of cash, since options force her

47

As long as options have a fixed exercise price at least equal to the stock
price on the grant date, they do not give rise to expense on the income statement
when they are granted or exercised. All the company has to do (and this
requirement has been imposed only recently) is to list the option’s estimated value
in a footnote. For a discussion of these rules, see Pat McConnell, Employee Stock
Option Expense Pro Forma Impact on EPS and Operating Margins, Bear Stearns
Equity Research 2 (May 1, 1998); Cf. James A. Angel & Douglas M. McCabe,
market Adjusted Options for Executive Compensation (Oct. 28, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript) (arguing that indexed options are rare because they do
not receive favorable accounting treatment). The inaccuracy of this approach is
easy to see. Even an out-of-the-money option has time value (i.e., the chance to
make a profit if the stock price rises without parting with the exercise price). See
supra Part I.A. While the firm does not have to spend cash to supply the option,
it does forgo cash it could have earned by selling options in the capital markets.
48

The extent to which accounting rules influence managers’ behavior is the
subject of debate. For a discussion, see, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Why Financial
Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for “Dirty Pooling” and Some Other
Types of Financial Cosmetics,” 22 De l. J. Corp. L. 141 (1997).
49

Favorable accounting treatment is not available to market-adjusted
options (i.e., which pay only those who outperform the market or a peer group).
As noted above, executives might transform a conventional option to a marketadjusted one with a genuine basket hedge. See Part I.C.1., supra. As we shall see,
a disadvantage of the tax barrier is that it also blocks these pro-shareholder hedges.
See Part V.C, infra.
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to defer consumption and bear risk.50 The risk is especially unappealing if she
expects the stock price to fall.51 Likewise, options make her even less diversified,
since her professional reputation is already tied to the firm’s success.52 In a wellfunctioning market, boards should not offer a premium if they expect the
executives to undo the desired incentive by hedging.53 For the same reason, the
market should discount the firm’s stock. To head off these penalties, executives
may wish to precommit not to hedge. Otherwise, a Pareto superior contract – a
premium for the executive, the incentive effect for shareholders – would not be
attained.
4. Comparison with Exercise of Option and Sale of Stock
Just as hedging terminates an option’s incentive function, so too will
exercise of the option and sale of the stock received. Even so, hedging is
potentially more detrimental in several ways. First, as long as vesting limits apply
only to exercise, but not to hedging, the hedging can eliminate all an executive’s
exposure to the stock price in a way that exercise cannot.54 Second, as long as
executives do not disclose all types of hedging, the practice can obstruct
transparency in contracting in a way that exercise will not (i.e., because the firm, as
counterparty, is always on notice of exercise). Third, hedging evades a financial
penalty – loss of time value – that discourages exercise when executives otherwise
are free to take this step. Each of the first three concerns arises because existing
contracts and disclosure obligations address hedging less adequately than exercise.
If these disparities can be adequately rectified – and I believe they can be to a
considerable extent – hedging could prove no worse than exercise (except for the

50

See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization &
Management 187-88 (1992) (noting that risk averse managers demand reward for
accepting incentive contracts)
51

Of course, if the executive has inside information that the stock price will
rise, she will accept options without a premium. See David Yermack, Good
Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J.
Fin. 449 (1997) (presenting evidence that executives increase levels of option
compensation prior to favorable announcements).
52

Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 51, at 430 (manager’s human capital is
tied to firm performance).
53

Boards might favor options, not for the incentive effect, but for their
favorable accounting treatment. See part VI.C., infra. If so, boards might object
less strenuously to hedging. Yet this accounting arbitrage – granting options so
they will be hedged – should not be encouraged, as it interferes with transparency.
See supra Part I.C.2.
54

Of course, her human capital would remain at risk.
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added transaction costs it entails). On the other hand, other concerns arise if
contracts can never govern hedging as effectively as exercise (e.g., because
hedging is costlier to monitor). For instance, firms might respond with a “lemon”
strategy that offers fewer options than executives want, thereby forgoing a Paretosuperior compensation contract.
5. Comparison with Stock Hedging
Whereas we have focused on governance concerns raised by options
hedging, such concerns also when an executive instead hedges stock (e.g.,
acquired in a market purchase or through exercise of an option). As we shall see,
the tax and other constraints on options hedging do not apply to stock hedging.
This could prove unfortunate because executive stock ownership can be
another way to reduce agency costs. Just as if the executive had sold the shares,
this benefit is lost if the executive hedges. If such hedging is not disclosed,
moreover, shareholders could be mislead about the degree of true executive share
ownership in valuing the company. In addition, since the executive could still vote
her hedged shares, she might use the vote to entrench her position.
Yet the governance concerns raised by stock hedging are less severe than
those raised by options hedging. Unlike options, which increase an executive’s
appetite for risk, stock ownership can increase agency costs by inducing the
executive to diversify or hedge excessively at the firm level.55 In some cases,
shareholders might want executives to hedge their stock. As long as the executive
has a large enough pool of options and these cannot be hedged, moreover, the
incremental exposure from stock holdings may not be as important; in other words,
executives’ ability to hedge stock is less of a concern because they cannot hedge
options, and thus have an unhedgeable core of exposure. Finally, whereas options
are the subject of a contract between the firm and executive, stock holdings are
less likely to be contractually required. Unlike options hedging, then, stock
hedging generally does not obstruct transparency or Pareto superiority in
compensation contracts.56

55

See, e.g., Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination
of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. Fin. 1097 (1996)
(firms whose managers hold more stock are more likely to hedge gold price risk
than firms whose managers hold more options). See also Brian Hall (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that options create better incentives than
stock).
56

Stock hedging would raise these concerns, however, in cases where the
firm requires executives to own a minimum amount of stock and compensates
them for doing so.
17

D. Interest of Executives in Hedging
Whereas we have seen that options hedging raises serious governance
concerns, the practice could prove tempting to executives. Indeed, because
executives frequently ask about the feasibility of options hedging, investment banks
have invested considerable time and money in trying (thus far unsuccessfully) to
develop a hedging strategy that does not trigger the tax and other barriers
described below.57 At first blush, executives’ interest in hedging may be surprising
since hedging may induce reductions in future pay.58 Yet the executive’s true self
interest is for no one to know (or assume) that she is hedging. Hedging in secret,
which is sometimes plausible under current law,59 should not trigger reductions in
future pay, even if the board is sufficiently independent to punish the executive
(which may not always be the case). Similarly, the market would not have

57

See, e.g., Randall Smith, For Internet Glitterati, It’s a Matter of Timing,
Wall St. J., June 28, 1999, at C1 (describing “cottage industry” emerging among
Wall Street derivatives experts “to advise Silicon Valley executives whose wealth
may be tied up in stock options”). Shaifali Puri, New Tools for the Options
Crowd, Fortune, Nov. 10, 1997, at 308 (describing “a growing number of banks’
private banking units” marketing derivatives to help executives hedge); Deger,
supra note 79 (noting that “clients hear about such [hedging] instruments
periodically from investment bankers”); Kroll, supra note 7, at 82 (deeming
requests for assistance in diversifying “a common question that compensation
professionals must address” and noting that “[i]n recent years, investment banking
firms have marketed [diversification strategies such as cashless collars] among
executives”).
58

See Part I.C.3, supra. A related concern is that the counterparty might
offer a discounted “lemon” price on the hedge, since hedging by an executive
could be a negative signal. Yet an investment bank, the usual counterparty, would
not demand this discount if (as is likely) it is hedging its own position by selling
short in the public market. See Lewis R. Steinberg, Using OTC Equity derivatives
For High-Net-Worth Individuals, in The Use of Derivatives in Tax Planning 211,
242 n. 110 (Frank Fabrozzi ed. 1998) (derivatives dealers “generally will not enter
into `long’ side of a hedging transaction” unless they can hedge by shorting the
underlying equity”). Nor would the investment bank worry about the price it will
get on the short sales, because these can be completed before the executive
discloses the hedge. See Section 16(a) (allowing disclosure up to 10 days after
sale).
59

See infra Part II.B.1
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evidence to justify discounting the firm’s stock,60 even if such discounting would
deter the executive (which, again, may not always be the case).61
For the executive, then, options hedging offers the liquidity and
diversification advantages of cash salary62 along with a risk premium (assuming the
board is unaware of the hedge). Once options have appreciated, hedging allows the
executive to spend her gains.63 The practice is appealing also if she believes the
stock price has peaked,64 perhaps based on inside information or – more likely, if
she is going to use the information to trade – on an insider’s jaundiced assessment
of publicly-available facts. Similarly, appreciation in the options increases the

60

Recognizing their inability to detect hedging, boards and the market
might assume an average level of hedging. Yet such “lemon pricing” could give
executives incentive to hedge more than average. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at
1523 (when information is imperfect, shareholders may assume governance of
average quality). This Article argues that the tax barrier (and, to an extent,
contractual and securities law barriers) avert this vicious cycle by persuading all
concerned that U.S. executives cannot hedge stock options.
61

A hedged executive, after all, is protected from declines in the stock price
(except their reputational effects), assuming she hedges before these declines are
triggered.
62

Cf. Heath, supra note 7, at 603 (diversification and liquidity encourage
executives to exercise).
63

This desire to hedge does not derive from risk aversion, but from the
executive’s intertemporal utility function (i.e., her preference for current rather
than future consumption). Cf. Victor Goldberg, Aversion to Risk Aversion in the
New Institutional Economics, 146 J.I.T.I. 216, 216 (1990) (arguing that scholars
should “invoke attitudes toward risk only as a last resort”). Note that executives
cannot necessarily finance consumption with borrowing, because lenders will be
unwilling to risk lending against the full value of an unhedged stock option.
64

Cf. Heath, supra note 7, at 623 (noting empirical evidence that executives
exercise in order to lock in gains above a “reference point” based on previous
year’s maximum value). To an extent, the executive may expect the firm to
“reprice” her options. See Christopher Gay, Hard To Lose, Wall St. J., April 8,
1999, at R6 (when market dips, executives frequently seek to have exercise price
on existing grants “repriced,” i.e., reduced to current market levels). Yet recent
accounting changes discourage such repricing. See Jennifer Reingold, Slimmer
Rewards for a Job Poorly Done, Bus. Wk., Feb. 15, 1999, at 38 (noting FASB’s
proposal to force firms to list expense of repriced options on income statement).
An executive who hedges, moreover, still benefits from the repricing; it offers her
new opportunity for gain (i.e., the difference between the old and new exercise
prices) that she has not sold through the hedge.
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wealth subject to firm specific risk,65 and thus the executive’s interest in
diversifying.66
II. EXISTING CONTRACTUAL AND SECURITIES-LAW BARRIERS TO
OPTIONS HEDGING
The prior Part showed that options hedging can have adverse
consequences for shareholders (and, indeed, for executives), but the practice could
prove tempting to executives. Given these competing interests, we might expect a
resolution by contract, perhaps with some input from the securities laws. This Part
describes existing contractual and securities-law constraints on options hedging.
Although these constraints block some instances of this practice, they contain
significant gaps that are filled by the tax law; contract and the securities laws also
contain even fewer restrictions on stock hedging and, as we shall see, these larger
gaps generally are not filled by the tax law.
These gaps should not be viewed as inevitable or irreparable. Despite the
potential costs of relying on contract or the securities laws, there are significant
advantages of doing so. These competing considerations are discussed in Part V,
and recommendations are offered in Part VI. But first, Part II begins by surveying
the current state of contractual and securities law constraints.

65

See Ruth Simon, Tax Strategies Aid Option Gains, Wall St. J., June 28,
1999, at C1 (“`An average executive is going to have three-quarters of his wealth
tied upon in options. . . . Planning around those options is essential.’”) (quoting
Arthur Kroll, a N.Y. executive compensation consultant); Zurack et al, supra note
22, at 5 (“We have found . . . that even the most bullish executives are concerned
about the lack of diversification in their personal portfolio because of its high
concentration of ISOs [employee stock options].”); Pallavi Gogoi, False
Impressions: More Companies Require Top Executives to Own Stock. The Result
Isn’t What Everybody Expected, Wall St. J., April 8, 1999, at R3 (“‘A lot of
executives, especially below the CEO level, are under pressure from their financial
advisers to diversify and not keep all their assets in one company’s stock.’”)
(quoting Paula Todd, head of executive compensation research and development
at Towers Perrin). Cf. Ofek & Yermack, supra note 7 (desire for diversification
prompts executives to sell stock received from exercising options).
66

Especially for executives who have more wealth than they can consume,
the dispositive factor may not be financial. As Professors Loewenstein and
Issacharoff have shown, people especially value what they earn through superior
performance. See George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence
in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. Behav. Decis. 157, 18 (1994) (noting studies
showing that people prefer to bet on their own judgments than on chance devices
with matched probabilities of winning). To some, past appreciation on an option is
evidence of talent, and hedging can be a way to protect this trophy.
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A. Existing Contractual Constraints on Options Hedging
Just as firms constrain exercise via contract, so too should they constrain
hedging; in so doing, they would largely address many of the concerns described
above. Nevertheless, direct contractual limits on options hedging are relatively
uncommon.67 Whereas the typical options plan bars transfer or assignment of the
option – that is, sales – they do not bar hedging (i.e., a separate transaction in
which a different option is sold).68 Firms that constrain hedging usually do so in
“trading policies,” which are seldom disclosed to the public.69 I have not done a
detailed survey, given the difficulty of gaining access to these policies. My
understanding from practitioners is that the policies vary widely and so it is
difficult to generalize about their contents. These experts report that many firms
do not have them. Where applicable, these policies typically cover only the most
senior executives and they do not cover basket hedging.70
Although direct contractual constraints are rare, a related contractual
provision – bans on pledging an option – could raise the transactions costs of
options hedging, although, by itself, it would not necessarily stop the practice. An
executive would encounter this constraint if, in hedging an option, she wanted
67

A recommendation of this Article is that they should be universal. For a
discussion, see infra Part VI.A.
68

See, e.g., Boeing Corp., Proxy (Apr. 27, 1998) (options are “exercisable
only by [the employee who received the grant], and shall not be assignable or
transferable by such recipient.” ).
69

For a rare exception, see Tetra Technologies Inc., Proxy (May 15, 1998)
(“The insider trading policy also prohibits directors, officers and employees of the
Company from purchasing securities of the Company on margin or in short sales
and from buying and selling puts, calls or options involving securities of the
Company (other than employee stock options).”).
70

Interview with George Spera, Shearman & Sterling (many firms do not
have trading policies that restrict hedging, and some that do govern only the most
senior executives); Interview with Barbara Nims, Davis Polk & Wardwell (among
firms that have considered the issue, hedging restrictions are fairly common; yet
many firms have not considered the issue). Cf. Mark A. Zurack et al, Goldman
Sachs Equity Derivatives Research: Investment Considerations for Employee
Stock Options, at 7 Tbl. 8 (June 30, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (pamphlet issued by Goldman Sachs on hedging NQOs does not mention
contractual restrictions, presumably because they are not common). Conversations
with investment bankers familiar with efforts to develop options hedging
techniques confirm that contractual bans on options hedging are relatively
uncommon (except in the financial industry, perhaps because of their greater
sophistication about derivatives). These individuals declined to go on record.
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either to borrow against its value or to sell the right to future option gain. The
latter step, an appealing way to pay for loss protection, commits the executive to a
potentially unlimited obligation since the stock price can rise without limit. As a
result, the derivatives-dealer counterparty will want the executive to pledge
something of value to secure this obligation. Yet option plans typically bar pledges
of options.71 Unless the executive has stock to pledge,72 she must pledge
something whose value will not track her obligation (e.g., mutual fund
investments purchased with hedging proceeds). As a result, the counterparty must
monitor the relative value of the collateral and obligation, thereby adding to the
hedge’s cost, in some cases quite considerably.73
B. Existing Securities Laws Constraints on Options Hedging
1. Disclosure Obligations
Given the potential for reputational sanctions, executives might not hedge
options if they had to disclose the transaction. However, disclosure obligations are
somewhat porous under current law. Until the mid-1990s, many believed there
were no disclosure obligations at all for derivatives transactions. Today, there still
are no disclosure obligations, to the firm or the market, for executives below the

71

As discussed above, option plans usually prevent executives from
assigning their options. A pledge is ordinarily considered an assignment. Nor is an
option effective collateral. If the executive defaults, the counterparty may be
unable to exercise or sell it. See Zurack, et al., supra note 22, at 7 (noting that
option “will not likely serve as usable collateral”).
72

The executive presumably does not have stock to pledge; otherwise, she
would hedge the stock instead of options, since the tax barrier is less daunting for
the former. See Part IV.E, supra.
73

As for other transactions costs, the investment bank’s fee usually is not a
barrier, except in preventing executives from paying in cash for loss protection.
See Part I.B, supra. In addition, long term options, necessary for options hedging,
have recently become available. See SIA Disagrees with Coalition on Intermarket
Coordination, 98 TNT 238-20 (reprinting letter from Anthony J. Cetta to Lon B.
Smith) (noting that over the counter market offers hedges with terms of up to ten
years). Finally, an executive may be concerned about losing unvested options
upon leaving the firm. If she hedges and the options appreciate, she will lose
money on the hedge while forfeiting the offsetting gain. If she leaves voluntarily,
though, her new employer may “gross her up” for options left behind. If she
leaves involuntarily, her severance package may protect her. See Murphy, supra
note 20, at 16 (severance packages often include accelerated vesting provisions).
In any event, executives presumably are more likely to be fired when the firm is
faring poorly, so that the options would not be deep in the money.
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rank of “insider” under Section 16.74 A 1996 SEC release clarified that insiders
must disclose the most straightforward hedges75 – transactions in which the
derivative’s value is explicitly based on the employer’s stock price. However,
insiders arguably can avoid this obligation with basket hedges (in which the
derivative’s value is based, not only on the employer’s stock price, but on other
assets as well).76
Moreover, the press has reported a perception among derivatives dealers
and their advisors that the disclosure obligations for derivatives are not always
honored.77 Surprisingly, even hedges that are disclosed may not come to the
market’s attention. According to Professors Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon, “When
filed, [insider hedging] transactions appear only on Table II of Form 4 filed by
insiders with the SEC. To our knowledge, none of the services that provide
insider trading data to the financial markets (and others) generally provide the data
needed to identify derivative instrument hedging transactions.”78
2. Speculation and Short Positions: Section 16(c)

74

Incentive compensation may work less effectively on noninsiders than on
the CEO, since their actions have less direct impact on the stock price; thus,
hedging by noninsiders may be less of a concern. Yet noninsiders do potentially
influence the firm’s performance, at least to an extent. They also may hold very
large grants, even individually, but certainly in the aggregate. See, e.g., Helyar &
Lublin, supra note 2, at B4 (noting that by 1997, 35% of 350 major companies had
option programs for all or a majority of workers and that, for example, 1200 of
General Electric Co’s employees have stock options valued at more than $1
million).
75

A 1996 SEC release requires disclosure of hedging. See Ownership
Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders,
Exchange Act Release No. 37,260, reprinted in 61 Fed. Reg. 30376, 30387 (June
14, 1996) (“Section 16 consequences arise from an equity swap transaction where
either party to the transaction is a Section 16 insider with respect to a security to
which the swap agreement relates.”).
76

For an example, see Part I.B.

77

See Ofick & Yermack, supra note ?.

78

Bettis et. al, supra note 2, at 2; see also Renee Deger, Locked In? Buy
That New Mansion Now, www.callaw.com/stories/edt0923.htmd (“Any disclosure
[of hedging with derivatives] is often done in an obscure or overlooked manner.”).
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The most effective securities law constraint on options hedging is Section
16(c),79 but it too is incomplete. Designed to prevent insider trading and to keep
managers from trying to depress their employer’s stock price,80 this rule makes it
illegal for insiders to sell their employer’s stock “short.”81 The gap in the statute,
though, is that it disallows only short sales, without addressing derivatives that
offer comparable economic returns. Hedging with these derivatives is in fact
permitted by a regulation, Rule 16c-4.82
Even so, this regulation does not necessarily bless options hedging
(although it clearly authorizes stock hedging). The SEC staff interprets the rule to
permit hedging only if the executive owns the stock itself, but not derivatives such
as options. For example, an insider can buy a put on 100 shares if she owns 100
shares, but not if she owns only an option to buy 100 shares.83 Nevertheless,

79

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, sec. 16(c), 48
Stat.881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. sec. 78p(c)) (“It shall be unlawful for
any [insider] . . . directly or indirectly, to sell any security of such issuer . . . if the
person selling the security of his principal . . . does not own the security sold . . .
.”). Unlike section 16(b), which allows plaintiffs to bring civil suits, section 16(c)
outlaws the practice. See Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 Hastings L.J. 391, 405 (1991)
(contrasting approaches of section 16(b) and 16(c)).
80

Congress added Section 16(c) in response to a widely publicized 1934
short sale by Albert Wiggins, the Chairman of the Board of Chase National Bank.
According to Professor Thel, Congress was responding to three concerns:
Wiggins’ access to inside information; his ability to conceal his activities from the
public; and his financial incentive to depress the stock price. See Thel, supra note
80, at 428.
81

A short sale is a bet that the stock price will decline, implemented by
selling borrowed shares. The seller promises to return shares to the lender in the
future, and hopes declines in the stock price will make these “replacement” shares
cheaper. See Schizer, supra note 127.
82

See 17 C.F.R. sec. 240.16c-4. Specifically, the rule allows “put
equivalent positions” (i.e., derivatives that appreciate as the stock price declines),
but only “so long as the amount of securities underlying the put equivalent position
does not exceed the amount of underlying securities otherwise owned.” Id.
83

This distinction, which transforms Rule 16c–4 into a barrier against
options hedging, was not meant to safeguard the incentive effects of options.
Instead, the SEC invoked congressional concerns about speculation:
“The most abusive investment pools of the early 1930's (that involved short
(continued...)
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aggressive insiders might be tempted to disregard this interpretation because the
SEC has not applied it all cases.84 In any event, rule 16c-4 does not prevent
insiders from using basket hedges (including, arguably, ones designed to track the
employer’s stock) and it does not apply to noninsiders. As a result, the rule, by
itself, would fail to block many instances of options hedging.
3. Section 16(b)
The “short swing profits” rule of Section 16(b) proves not to be a
constraint here. In general, it allows the firm to recover any profit the firm’s
insiders earn from buying and selling issuer stock within six months. Whereas
hedging with a derivative is treated as a “matcheable” sale under recently revised
rules, an insider typically can avoid this liability by not buying any stock85 within
six months of entering into a hedge.86
4. Material Information and Rule 10b-5
83

(...continued)
selling) involved short selling of the stock while holding options to protect
against a price increase. In each pool mentioned in the legislative history,
Congress was quite concerned that the pool insiders would not exercise the
option but would instead repurchase the stock in the open market. This
practice was viewed as unethical. Based on this Congressional concern, no
relief is proposed for short selling against derivative securities.” See SEC
Release Nos. 34-26333; 35-24768, 1988 SEC Lexis 2380 (proposing and
explaining Rule 16c-4).
84

For example, two recent SEC letters allow insiders to hedge even though
they hold convertible preferred stock (i.e., a derivative) instead of the underlying
common. The letters offer no reasoning to explain the departure from the SEC’s
usual view. See Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC NoAct Lexis 407 (March 12, 1997): Time Warner, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC
No-Act. Lexis 627 (Aug. 9, 1995).
85

An executive can hedge within six months of receiving an option, because
the latter is not a matcheable transaction if it satisfies certain criteria. On the
hedge, the “matcheable” date is when it begins, not when it is settled.
86

Section 16(b) can be more daunting when the executive “cash settles” the
hedge (e.g., to avoid securities law requirements for delivering stock, such as the
seller’s obligation to deliver a prospectus or the buyer’s obligation not to resell
privately-placed shares for a year). Because cash settlement of a “short” derivative
is treated as a purchase, section 16(b) is triggered if the executive sells stock
within six months of cash-settling a hedge. She may need to sell, though, to raise
money for cash settlement. To avoid liability, the executive might cash-settle with
borrowed funds or delay settlement until she retires and is no longer an insider.
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All executives, including noninsiders, will want to avoid liability for trading
based on inside information. Yet although this goal may delay a hedging
transaction (e.g., until after an earnings announcement), it will not necessarily stop
it.87 An exception is when the hedge itself is material. Yet very senior executives,
whose hedging is most likely to be material, already are disclosing single stock
hedges,88 and the materiality of a basket hedge could be debatable.
C. Summary of Existing Contractual and Securities Law Constraints
Whereas existing contractual and securities law constraints are sufficient to
block many instances of options hedging, they would not catch them all.
Executives below the rank of insider are relatively unconstrained. They do not
have to disclose their hedges and generally are free to engage even in single-stock
hedges, subject only to transaction costs (e.g., arising from constraints on
pledging). Insiders are relatively more constrained. They would have to disclose
single-stock option hedges and might be barred from them altogether under the
SEC’s interpretation of rule 16c-4. Nevertheless, insiders generally can avoid
these constraints with a basket hedge. If they are aggressive – and, as the press
has noted, some tend to be aggressive in this context, perhaps on the theory that
derivatives transactions are hard for the firm or SEC to detect – executives might
even use a “basket” that almost perfectly replicates the performance of their
employers’ stock. The point is, then, that contractual and securities law
constraints have potentially significant gaps. As we see in the next two Parts,
these are filled by an unexpected ally, the tax law – but in an inflexible and
potentially unstable way. Given these shortcomings, this Article’s
recommendation is to refine the contractual and securities law constraints. But
first, we turn to the U.S. tax law’s role in backstopping the incentive effect of
options.
III. TAX DISINCENTIVES TO EXERCISE
The last two Parts show that executives sometimes have a private interest
in exercising or hedging options to finance consumption or diversification, and

87

As discussed above, though, delaying the timing may be enough to
prevent the hedging. The tax risks will discourage executives unless they are
certain the stock price will decline. Timing restrictions can undermine this
certainty.
88

See infra Part II.B.1. Section 16(a) does not require disclosure until after
the hedge is complete. See id. In some circumstances, Rule 10b-5 may force the
executive to accelerate disclosure.
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that contract and the securities laws police exercise more directly and effectively
than hedging. The purpose of this Part and Part IV is to show the tax law’s role in
reinforcing contractual and securities-law constraints on these exit strategies.
Before turning to tax law constraints on hedging, which are discussed in
Part IV, we discuss two issues in Part III. First, given the tax law’s important role
in tying executives to their stock options, to what extent did Congress intend to
pursue this corporate governance goal with the tax law? Section A begins with
two measures – the incentive stock option rules and Section 162(m)’s exception
for performance-based pay – that arguably are deliberate efforts to encourage
receipt (and, in the former case, retention) of options. As we shall see, these
measures, by themselves, have not been especially significant. Rather, as Section
B shows, the most effective tax constraint on exercising options derives from tax
rules for so-called nonqualified options, which were not fashioned with corporate
governance in mind. Even so, these rules discourage (though they do not prevent)
executives from exercising options. Part IV then discusses tax constraints on
hedging options, which are even more effective and are also largely inadvertent.
A. Deliberate Tax Preferences for Options
Although Congress has used the tax law to promote the incentive value of
options – through special rules for “incentive” stock options and, arguably, in
Section 162(m)’s exception for performance-based pay – these intentional efforts
have achieved less than unintended ones.
1. Incentive Stock Options
In an attempt to favor options, the Code purports to treat “incentive” stock
options (“ISOs”) more favorably than generic “nonqualified” options (“NQOs”).89
An ISO is not taxed at ordinary rates when exercised, as is an NQO; instead, the
ISO is taxed at capital gain rates, and the tax is deferred until the executive sells
the stock received upon exercise.90 To ensure that executives keep the option,
Congress conditions this favorable treatment on a holding period for both the
option and the stock acquired through it.91 Yet ISOs are uncommon because the
89

See Michael W. Melton, The Alchemy of Incentive Options – Turning
Employee Income Into Gold, 68 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 500 (1983) (noting intended
incentive effect of ISOs). The tax rules for ISOs are in Section 422 et seq. and the
rules for NQOs are in Section 83. For a good summary, see Melton, supra, at
498-500.
90

See Section 421(a)(1); Melton, supra note 90, at 500. For the rules on
NQOs, see infra note 101 and accompanying text.
91

See Section 422(a)(1). See Barbara J. Raasch & Judith L. Rowland,
(continued...)
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dollar value of annual ISO grants is strictly limited.92 Nor is the tax treatment of
ISOs as generous as it seems. The executive often owes alternative minimum tax
(“AMT”) upon exercising the option,93 and the firm cannot take a deduction, as it
can for an NQO. Ironically, an NQO is usually more tax-efficient.94
2. 162(m)
Under section 162(m), firms cannot deduct annual compensation of key
employees above $1 million.95 However, this limit does not apply to certain
compensation “payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more
performance goals.”96 Since Congress explained the limit as a way to reduce
executive compensation,97 the explosion of option grants suggests the measure
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(...continued)
Stock Option Planning, Taxes, Jan. 1999, at 41. It is also difficult to hedge ISOs.
See Part IV.D, infra.
92

See Section 422(d) (underlying stock cannot be worth more than
$100,000 for annual ISO grant).
93

See Section 56(b)(3) (deeming ISO gains a preference subject to
alternative minimum tax); Raasch & Rowland, supra note 92, at 41. The AMT is
supposed to ensure that all profitable taxpayers pay a minimum tax: it imposes tax
on those who make excessive use of so-called tax preferences such as favorable
depreciation methods, tax-exempt interest on certain bonds, etc. See Section 57.
For a discussion, see generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Perception, Reality and
Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 Taxes 91 (1988). For discussion
of a congressional proposal to repeal the AMT, see Part IV.D.1.
94

See Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Taxes and Business Strategy
187-90 (1992) (noting that NQOs can offer executive the same after-tax payment
as an ISO at lower cost to the firm, as long as firm and executive are subject to
comparable tax rates).
95

See Section 162(m)(1).

96

See Section 162(m)(4)(C). The legislative history indicates that this
performance-pay exception generally includes executive stock options. House
Report, reprinted at CCH 21,521. (“Stock options or other stock appreciation
rights generally are treated as meeting the exception for performance-based
compensation, provided that the requirements for outside director and shareholder
approval are met.”) The options also may not be in-the-money when granted. Id.
97

Draft of Finance Committee Revenue Provisions at 69, reprinted in
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (S. 1134) title VIII, RIA United
(continued...)
28

backfired (or was never intended to work). A more charitable reading, though, is
that section 162(m) was supposed to promote options (as well as other
“performance compensation,” such as bonuses based on accounting earnings).98
Yet as a preference for options, Section 162(m) has a notable gap; it contains no
unequivocal ban on selling or hedging them.99
B. The Accidental Tax Disincentive to Exercise of NQOs
Ironically, the tax law aids corporate governance through the rules for
NQOs, even though these were forged with hardly a thought to this issue.
Executives are encouraged to hold their NQOs, instead of exercising them,
because tax is deferred until exercise.100 This deferral reduces the tax by allowing
97

(...continued)
States Tax Reporter, June 1993 (“Recently, the amount of compensation received
by corporate executives has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. The
committee believes that excessive compensation will be reduced [by the $1 million
cap].”).
98

Congressional hearings contained numerous endorsements of
performance based pay. For example, Senator Baucus said, “corporations need to
inject performance, scrutiny, and disclosure into the executive compensation
equation. And if they refuse, we have an obligation to ensure that tax policy or
other public policy provides no comfort.” Executive Compensation Hearings on
S. 2298, H.R. 4727 and H.R. 5260 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong. (1992). Likewise, a Treasury official at
the time, Catherine Creech, said at a meeting of the DC bar that 162(m) “was not
intended to be a revenue raising provision, but a behavior shaping provision. The
exception for performance based compensation is not a loophole.” Megan Reilly,
Former Treasury Official discusses Executive Compensation Cap, 62 Tax Notes
747 (Feb. 3, 1994).
99

The legislative history almost stumbles into conditioning the firm’s
deduction on the absence of hedging by providing: “[I]f an executive is otherwise
protected from risk of loss (such as through automatic repricing), the
compensation is not performance-based.” See id. Even assuming legislative
history is authoritative, though, the taint seems to arise only if the firm, and not a
third party, supplies this loss protection. Although the firm’s role is not an explicit
condition, it is implied by the automatic repricing example because only the firm
can reprice its options. In addition, the general principle elucidated by this
language is that “stock based compensation” — a phrase that describes the
arrangement with the firm, and not with third parties — must not be “dependent
on factors other than corporate performance.”
100

Receipt of property as compensation generally is taxable. See United
(continued...)
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continued investment of amounts that otherwise would fund the tax.101 Balanced
against this “lock-in,” though, is a countervailing tax reason to exercise. The
executive can reinvest in an asset that yields capital gain, taxed at a lower rate; the
option, in contrast, yields only ordinary income.102 Of course, this switch is no
blessing if the new investment generates less valuable capital losses.103 Yet if the
100

(...continued)
States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821
(1950). Yet under Treas. Reg. 1.83-1(a), this principle is not applied to an NQO
that has no “readily ascertainable fair market value,” for example, due to
restrictions on transferability. See 1.83-7(b)(1) (options have “readily
ascertainable fair market value” within meaning of regulation if they are “actively
traded on an established market”); 1.83-7(b)(2) (specifying four conditions that
give nontraded options readily ascertainable fair market value, including being
transferable and immediately exercisable). Instead, the option’s “spread” is taxed
as ordinary income upon exercise. See 1.83-7(a) (“If section 83(a) does not apply
to the grant of such an option . . . , sections 83(a) and 83(b) shall apply at the time
the option is exercised . . . .”); Section 83(a) (including in gross income “the
excess of . . . the fair market value of such property . . . over . . . the amount (if
any) paid for such property”).
101

For a discussion of the tax reducing effects of deferral, see David M.
Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1549 (1998). Realization is
the rule that defers tax on appreciated property until the property is sold.
102

See Section 83(a)(1) (providing for inclusion in gross income of person
who performed services). Accordingly, this “lock-in” is weaker than the
analogous one caused by the realization rule. For a discussion of the latter, see
Schizer, supra note 102, at 1610.
103

Loss on the option effectively is ordinary loss — or, to be precise, a
reduction in ordinary income that otherwise would accrue upon exercise. If option
losses and gains are equally probable, there is no tax advantage to exercising the
option; the prospect of favored capital gains is balanced against the prospect of
disfavored capital losses. Cf. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate
Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It
Matter?, 47 Tax L. Rev. 377, 396-400) (under assumed conditions, the tax rate on
risk does not matter; the tax rate is relevant only in its effect on the risk free
return); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency
and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731, 763
(1995) (same). Nor does it pay to exercise the option merely to reduce the tax
rate on the risk free return (“R”). Even though the after-tax rate of return is
increased (i.e., from .6R to .8R), the amount invested (“I”) shrinks even more
dramatically (from I to .6 I, since .4I will fund the tax). The risk free return on the
option (.6RI) will always exceed the risk free return on the smaller new investment
(continued...)
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option and the alternative are each expected to appreciate, the tax law creates
competing incentives: Although exercising the option increases her after-tax rate of
return, it depletes her investment’s size. As the following examples show, the tax
incentive to keep the option is usually the stronger one. It also is reinforced by a
nontax incentive to keep the option, the ability to earn a return on the exercise
price before paying it. Ultimately, though, these incentives are not likely to
prevent exercise in all cases, but to discourage it in marginal ones.104 In a sense,
they reinforce existing contractual restrictions on exercise, but could never
substitute for them.
1. Illustrative Examples
Executives might exercise their option and sell the stock for at least three
reasons: to diversify; to finance consumption; or to avoid expected losses.105 The
tax disincentive is more formidable in the first two scenarios than in the third.
a. Diversification
Assume the executive has an option to buy one share of EmployerCo stock
at $50 and the stock is now trading at $150. If she exercises the option and sells
the stock at a $100 gain, she pays approximately $40 of tax and has $60 to
reinvest in MutualFund. As Table 3 shows, this switch does not pay even if she
expects a 14% return on MutualFund (taxable at the 20% capital gain rates) and
only a 12% return on EmployerCo stock (taxable at the 40% ordinary income
rate). Exercising the option reduces her investment in two ways: first, by the
deferred tax; second, by the exercise price.106
103

(...continued)
(.8*.6RI, or .48RI).
104

This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence. Professors Ofek
and Yermack have noted that executives tend to exercise fewer options than they
would if guided solely by a desire to diversify. Specifically, when they receive new
grants (and thus new exposure to firm-specific risk), executives do not exercise as
many vested options (and thus do not sell as many shares) as needed to cancel out
this new exposure. See Ofek & Yermack, supra note 7. This reluctance may
derive, in part, from the tax lock-in described above.
105

Motivations to exercise the option will resemble motivations to hedge it.
For discussions of the latter, see supra Part I.D.
106

The ability to “invest” the exercise price before parting with it gives the
option “time value.” See supra Part I.A; see also Heath, supra note 7, at 603
(“premature exercise sacrifices substantial value -- on the order of 25% of the
option’s expected value”). An offsetting consideration is that exercise allows the
(continued...)
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TABLE 3: NQO LOCK-IN AND DIVERSIFICATION
Investment

Amount
Invested

Pre-tax
Return

Pre-tax
Amount
Earned

Tax Rate

Tax

After-tax
Amount
Earned

Mutual
Fund

60

14%

8.40

20%

1.68

6.72

Option:
Exercise
Price
1
Ignored
07

100

12%

12.00

40%

4.80

7.20

Option:
Exercise
Price
Included
108

150

12%

18

40%

7.20

10.80

To generalize with variables, assume the stock is trading at S and the
option’s exercise price is E. The difference between these amounts, I, is the
option’s intrinsic value (i.e., the profit that would be earned by exercising the
option). In other words, I + E = S. Assume that R and N are the (positive) returns
expected on the option and MutualFund, respectively.
By exercising the option and selling the stock, the executive can extract the
option’s intrinsic value, I. After taxes, she can reinvest .6I in MutualFund. Her
after-tax return will be .8N * .6I or .48NI. What if instead she keeps the option?
We focus first on the effects of tax deferral while ignoring the ability to invest the
exercise price. The executive can invest the full I and her after-tax return will be
.6*R*I. Comparing the two, we see that it will pay to keep the option as long as:
.6RI > .48NI
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(...continued)
executive to share in dividends, but dividend yields are at historic lows. Cf.
Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, (Some of) the Essentials of Finance and
Investment 238 (1993) (making common assumption, in discussing option
valuation, that option holder receives all cash flows generated by underlying).
107

This computation isolates the effect of the tax law by assuming the
executive is investing the $40 of deferred tax, but not the exercise price.
108

This computation adds in the effect of investing the exercise price, a
benefit that derives from the economics of options rather than the tax law.
32

.6R > .48N
R > .8N
The tax effect thus discourages exercise if the option’s expected return is at least
4/5 as great as the return on the new investment.109
Once we factor in the exercise price, the effect is more dramatic. The
executive will invest I + E and her after-tax return will be:
.6R(I + E).
It thus pays to keep the option110 as long as:
.6R(I + E) > .6 * .8 NI
R (I + E) > .8NI.
Even if the option’s expected return is less than 4/5 of the return on the new
investment, the return on the exercise price (RE) can make up the shortfall.
b. Financing Consumption
By increasing the option’s return, tax-deferral increases the opportunity
cost of exercising it to finance consumption. For example, exercising the above
option would yield $60 after tax. But the opportunity cost is to forgo the 12%

109

As a result, the executive should not exercise the option early if she
intends to keep the stock. Assuming she funds her tax on the option by reducing
the size of her position, which usually is the case, the executive would lose 40% of
her position (or more if we factor in her ability to invest the exercise price). The
increase in her rate of return from .6R to .8R is too small to make up the shortfall.
Instead of earning .6RI from the option, she will earn only .8*.6RI, or .48RI. See
Raasch & Rowland, supra note 28, at 33; see also Zurack, supra note 71, at 4. To
avoid reducing her position’s size, the executive could borrow to fund the tax and
exercise price, but the interest charge would reduce her return. In any event, the
executive can earn the same return — capital gain offset by an interest charge —
without exercising the option; she can simply borrow to buy additional stock.
110

To see how dramatic this effect is, assume that the exercise price is $100,
the stock is at $300, the expected return on the option is 10%, and the expected
return on the new investment is 30%. Even tripling the return does not justify a
switch: .10(300) > .8(.30)(100), or 30 > 24.
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return (or 7.2% after-taxes),111 not just on the $60 to be consumed, but also on the
deferred tax ($40) and the exercise price ($50). The opportunity cost rises from
$4.32 to $10.80.112
c. Preventing Loss on Option
When the executive expects depreciation on her option and appreciation on
an alternative investment, lock-in is weakest, though still a factor.113 By exercising
the option, the executive loses the ability to invest other people’s money (i.e., the
government’s deferred tax and the employer’s exercise price) at no interest114 and
no obligation to pay it back if she loses it. Admittedly, this “nonrecourse loan”
must be invested in the option, which is expected to depreciate. If this decline is
uncertain or temporary, though, the “loan” may be hard to give up.
3. Accidental Origin of Tax Barrier to Exercise
The tax rules for NQOs are an imperfect measure of income. Because
receiving an option is comparable, economically, to receiving cash and investing it
in an option, it arguably would be more accurate for the option’s fair market value
to be ordinary income when the executive receives it and for subsequent gains to
be capital.115 Correspondingly, the firm would deduct the option’s fair market

111

.6 * 12 = 7.2

112

In general terms, the opportunity cost of consuming the after-tax
proceeds on her option is not just .6R*.6I, or .36RI. Rather, it is .6R(I +E). In
the above example, 12% of 60 is 7.20, or 4.32 after a 40% tax. Yet the return is
earned not just on 60, but on 150 (i.e., 60 + 40 + 50). 12% of 150 is 18, or 10.80
after a 40% tax. Note that these numbers represent the future value, rather than
the present value. The disparity would be comparable, though, if we discounted
the numbers.
113

If she expects both to decline, switching is unappealing because losses
would become capital instead of ordinary. See supra note 104.
114

For the tax deferral, she never will pay interest. For the exercise price,
she prepaid this “interest” through the option premium (i.e., the cash salary
forgone for the option). See Gilson & Black, supra note 107, at 239-40 (value of
option includes time value of keeping exercise price until maturity).
115

See Melton, supra note 90, at 492 (option grant is “functionally
equivalent to receiving cash compensation and then purchasing the option”). A
difference is that the executive may have to forfeit the option (e.g., upon leaving
the firm), something that would seldom be true of cash. Yet instead of addressing
this forfeiture risk with deferral, as current law does, the tax law could factor this
(continued...)
34

value upon delivering it, and would treat subsequent changes in value as tax-free
capital transactions.116
By diverging from this model, the tax law serves corporate governance
quite elegantly. If the executive were taxed upon receiving the option, regardless
of whether she exercised or sold it, she would have no tax incentive to keep the
option.117 Instead, the executive owes tax only if she sells or exercises the option,
a step the corporation will not want her to take but one the executive may find
tempting. The tax law helps contain this impulse.118 Nor is this tax rule costly to
the treasury. The reduced tax burden on the executive (from deferral of the tax) is
matched by an increased tax burden on the firm (from deferral of the deduction).
A special tax is thus imposed on the benefitting party. If the firm and executive
have roughly equal tax rates, as often is the case, the treasury comes out basically
even.119
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(...continued)
risk into valuation when the option is granted; then, subsequent appreciation
deriving from lapse of forfeiture restrictions (as opposed to increases in the stock
price) could be taxed as ordinary income. Alternatively, the option could be
valued at grant without regard to forfeiture risk; subsequent lapse of restrictions
could be ignored and forfeiture could trigger an ordinary deduction. For a
discussion, see Melton, supra, at 495-97.
116

Cf. Section 1032 (corporations have no gain or loss from transactions in
their own stock or options). Appreciation deriving from lapse of restrictions,
though, might be treated as deductible compensation.
117

If immediate sales are barred by contract, though, the executive can
become locked in once the option has appreciated (assuming the appreciation is
taxed under the realization rule). Cf. Schizer, supra note 102, at 1610 (describing
lock-in under realization rule).
118

I do not mean to suggest, though, that the tax law is uniquely able to
achieve this function. Contract can do so as well (e.g., through slow vesting or
awards that grow with the executive’s holding period). For a discussion of the
relative merits of a tax-based solution, see infra Part V.
119

The revenue effects of delaying exercise depend on whether the stock
price rises or falls after exercise. Thereafter, the issuer no longer can claim a
deduction for appreciation. See section 1032 (corporations have no gain or loss
on transactions in their stock and options). But the holder of the stock (e.g., the
executive or her transferee) would typically owe a 20% capital gains tax, leaving
the government with 20% of the appreciation. In contrast, if the stock declines
after exercise, the issuer will not have taxable income and the holder will have a
20% capital loss.
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Yet none of this was intended. In taxing NQOs, the Supreme Court,
Congress and the Treasury have grappled with valuation rather than corporate
governance. The concern is that grant-date valuations can prove self-serving (e.g.,
so the firm’s deduction could exceed the employee’s income from the same
NQO).120 Thus, Commissioner v. LoBue rejects this approach, advocated by
Justice Harlan in dissent, without mentioning corporate governance.121 Rather, as
Professor Chirelstein has observed, the debate between majority and dissent
“appears to have turned on a question of fact, namely, whether the options granted
to LoBue did, or didn’t, have an ascertainable market value at the date of grant.”122
As he notes, this valuation concern persists under section 83, LoBue’s statutory
heir.123 Yet, sometimes rules crafted to address administrability concerns, such as
valuation, can yield unintended benefits. I have construed the realization rule in
these terms.124 The tax disincentive to exercising options should also be viewed in
this light – in effect, as a corporate governance windfall. As we shall see, so too
should the tax constraints on hedging.
IV. TAX BARRIERS TO HEDGING
We have seen that the tax rules for NQOs serve a corporate governance
function by discouraging executives from exercising options. Yet discouraging
exercise is only part of the battle. The other exit strategy, hedging, must be at
least as tax-expensive as exercise. That said, the consequences do not have to be

120

See 383--2nd, Tax Management Portfolio, Income Taxation of
Nonstatutory Stock Options, at II.A.2.d (citing valuation and whipsaw concerns as
rationale for not taxing option when granted). Valuation with a Black Scholes
model is difficult because the option’s term is uncertain (e.g., the option may
terminate if the executive leaves the firm).
121

351 U.S. 243 (1956). Interestingly, the tax court offered the option’s
incentive effect as a reason not to tax it. See Commissioner v. LoBue, 22 T.C.
440 (1994); see also Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 223 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1955)
(upholding tax court on the same theory). Yet tax court was not trying to promote
better corporate governance, but to measure income more accurately. It was
inappropriate to treat the option as income, the tax court said, since the option was
given for the employer’s convenience. The Supreme Court properly rejected this
theory by observing that the option was not a gift, and thus had to be income.
122

Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 372 (8th ed. 1997).

123

Id. For the path from LoBue to the current regulations under section 83,
see Tax Management Portfolio, supra note 121, at II.A.2.d.
124

See Schizer, supra note 102, at 1549 (defending realization as an
effective way to reduce tax burden on investments).
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identical. The tax “pain” does not have to be loss of deferral, as long as it is
equally costly (or, as it turns out, more so).
Sections A through C describe three adverse tax consequences that can be
triggered by options hedging: accelerated taxable gain on the option; potentially
indefinite deferral of loss on the hedge; and a tax without a corresponding pretax
profit, arising because a higher tax rate applies to (ordinary) option gains than to
offsetting hedging (capital) losses. Section D discusses planning strategies to
avoid these results; although some nearly succeed, none does under current law.
In contrast, Section E describes stock hedging, which generally does not trigger
punitive tax consequences. Finally, Section F returns to options hedging to
describe the limited scope, the accidental origins, and the potential fragility of the
tax barrier to this practice.
A. Forgoing Deferral of Gain: Constructive Sale Rules
Of the tax risks from options hedging, loss of deferral is the least daunting.
The executive can defer her tax by ensuring that the hedge is not treated as a sale
under case law 125 or as a so-called “constructive sale,” a statutory concept
introduced in 1997 to impose tax on certain hedging transactions.126 There is an
unreality to this inquiry, in a sense, since the hedge’s very purpose is to simulate a
sale. Even so, “sales” and “constructive sales” are technical concepts, and a hedge
can be crafted not to qualify as either. Executives can avoid a sale by keeping
legal title to the option and the right to dispose of it.127 To avoid a constructive
sale, the executive should transfer only some -- and, in the language of the
legislative history, not “substantially all” – of the option’s economic return.128 As I
125

Under section 83, selling the option would trigger a tax, just as
exercising it would. See section 83(a).
126

See Section 1259. For a discussion, see David M. Schizer, Hedging
Under Section 1259, Tax Notes, July 22, 1999, at 345.
127

See Edward Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, Taxes
783 (Dec. 1993) (properly crafted hedge of publicly traded assets not treated as
sale); see also Joint Committee, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in
1997 (“Under prior law [before constructive sale rule was enacted], transactions
designed to reduce or eliminate risk of loss on financial assets generally did not
cause realization.”).
128

S. Rep. No. 105-33, 105th Cong. 1st Sess, at 126. Without retaining any
exposure to an NQO’s return, executives still have a technical argument.
Arguably, an asset can be the subject of a constructive sale only if a sale would
yield “gain,” as opposed to income. See section 1259(a)(1) (“If there is a
constructive sale of an appreciated financial position . . . the taxpayer shall
(continued...)
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have written elsewhere, this standard leaves ample room for hedging.129 How
much economic exposure must the executive keep? Guidance from the Treasury is
expected, since the statute does not offer a quantitative test. As a rule of thumb,130
the New York State Bar Association (“NYSBA”) suggests a band of exposure
equal to at least 20% of the asset’s value.131
B. Tax Without Profit: Potentially Indefinite Deferral of Tax Losses
Options hedging can be deterred not only by accelerating tax on gains, but
also by deferring deduction of losses. The point of a hedge, after all, is to cancel
out changes in the option’s value. If the option depreciates by $100,000, the
hedge must supply an offsetting $100,000 of income; likewise, if the option
appreciates by $100,000, the hedge will yield an offsetting $100,000 loss. What if,
in the latter case, the executive cannot deduct this $100,000 loss? She will have
$100,000 of additional taxable income, and a $39,600 extra tax liability, with no
pre-tax gains to pay it. As we shall see, this loss deferral, and the tax without
profit it causes, can occur if the option appreciates after the hedge but not if it
depreciates. Two separate regimes can trigger loss deferral: the capital loss
limitations and straddle rules.
1. Character Mismatch
128

(...continued)
recognize gain as if such position were sold . . . .”). NQOs yield only the latter.
See supra note 103.
129

See Schizer, supra note 38, at 345 (tax-free hedging can continue under
section 1259).
130

The NYSBA’s proposed safe harbor has two other requirements as well:
first, the band of exposure must include the current stock price; second, the hedge
must not last more than five years. A problem with this “gross spread” approach is
its indifference to volatility. Keeping a 20% band is more meaningful for a
nonvolatile utility than for a volatile Internet stock, as the latter is more likely to
trade outside that range. To account for volatility, the NYSBA recommends use
of options pricing to value retained exposure as a proportion of total exposure.
For a discussion, see Schizer, supra note 127, at 351. In the interests of full
disclosure, I was an author of the report offering these recommendations, but they
represent the organization’s views.
131

For example, assume an executive holds options to purchase 10,000
shares for $10 per share and the stock is now trading at $100. If the executive
buys a put with an exercise price of $100 and sells a call with an exercise price of
$102, thus leaving herself only a $2 band of exposure, she will have a constructive
sale. On the other hand, under the NYSBA’s guideline, she avoids this result if her
short call’s exercise price is $120.
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If the option appreciates after the executive hedges, option gains will be
ordinary and corresponding hedging losses generally will be capital.132 Because
capital losses cannot offset the tax on ordinary income,133 the losses will be
deferred unless the executive has capital gains from other investments. For
example, assume an executive has options to buy 10,000 shares at $10, and the
stock is trading at $100. She enters into a collar that leaves her exposed to price
fluctuations between $90 and $110.134 Thus, her pretax profit is guaranteed to be
at least $800,000 and could be as much as $1 million. Yet as the table below
shows, taxpayers who cannot use their capital losses find this pretax gain eroded -indeed, it can turn into a loss -- as the underlying stock appreciates.135

132

Compare Section 83(a) (ordinary character for compensatory option
gains) with Section 1234A (losses on derivatives generally capital). See also
Steinberg, supra note 59, at 221-26 (losses are capital on options, forwards, and
collars). For a discussion of swaps and contingent debt, which generate ordinary
losses, see infra Part IV.D.1 & 2.
133

See section 1211. For individuals, the modest sum of $3000 of capital
loss can offset ordinary income each year. Section 1211's purpose is to prevent
taxpayers from currently deducting losses while deferring inclusion of gains. See
Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations
Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 Tax L. Rev. 677 (1993). This tax
reduction strategy exploits the so-called “timing option” implicit in the realization
rule. For a discussion, see George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium
with Personal Tax, 51 Econometrica 611, 621-23 (1983) (discussing timing
option). See also Schizer, supra note 102, at 1557-60 (same).
134

The collar protects her from risk of loss by allowing her to sell for $90,
but limits her opportunity for gain by obligating her to sell for $110.
135

If the stock price rises to $200, she nets a $1 million pre-tax profit. In
addition, she has an extra $900,000 of ordinary income on the option and a
corresponding $900,000 capital loss on the hedge. Yet she cannot use this loss to
avoid tax on the ordinary income. Assuming she does not have capital gains from
another investment, her tax bill rises by $356,400 (i.e., 39.6 * 900,000), making
her total current tax bill ($752,400) more than 75% of her economic profit. As
Table 4 shows, moreover, if the price goes to $300, her $1.14 million current tax
bill will exceed her $1 million economic profit.
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TABLE 4: ECONOMIC PROFIT AND TAX BILL:
90-110 COLLAR ON OPTION WITH $10 EXERCISE PRICE
Stock Price at Maturity

200

300

Stock Price at Time of
Hedge

100

100

Economic Gain

1 million

1 million

Taxable Income from
Option

1.9 million

2.9 million

Deferred Capital Loss
from Hedge

900,000

1.9 million

Current Tax Bill

752,400

1,148,400

After-tax Cash

247,600

(148,000)

Because capital loss on the hedge is potentially unlimited, since it grows
with the employer’s stock price, not all executives will be sure, ex ante, of having
enough gains to use all their losses. The executive thus bears a risk without any
offsetting reward, because having capital gains allows her, at most, to break
even.136 Even executives who expect to have gain, moreover, could be forced to
recognize it prematurely. If the executive would otherwise keep her appreciated
capital asset for years after her hedge matures — indeed, until she dies, so that her
tax would be forgiven137 — hedging loss would shelter gain that, in effect, does not
need sheltering.
2. Straddle Rules
The straddle rules of Section 1092 could defer losses indefinitely, although
the taxpayer has a plausible argument to avoid this result, reinforced by a June
1999 IRS ruling. The straddle regime was not aimed at a corporate governance
problem, but at a 1970's tax shelter that “gamed” the realization rule. Taxpayers

136

Thus, as Professor Knoll has observed, hedging an ordinary asset with a
capital asset is like writing the government a free call option. See Michael S.
Knoll, Hedging in an Economy with Asymmetric Taxes: A Comment on Moshe
Ayre Milevsky & Eliezer Z. Prisman, U.S.C. Law School Working Paper Series
No. 98-16.
137

See section 1014 (basis in property acquired from a decedent generally is
fair market value on date of death); see generally, Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains
at Death, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 361 (1993) (describing advantages to taxpayer of basis
“step-up” at death).
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would enter into offsetting positions (e.g., a contract to buy and sell gold at the
same price) and would claim a current deduction for the unprofitable one while
deferring tax on the profitable one.138 In response, the straddle rules prevent
taxpayers who have straddles (i.e., two offsetting positions) from deducting a loss
before recognizing gain in offsetting positions.139 Because the hedge and option
generally would be a straddle,140 the executive could not deduct hedging losses
before exercising the option.141
Yet losses could be deferred indefinitely under the loss-suspension rule for
“unbalanced” straddles, i.e., hedges of less than all the taxpayer’s positions.
Under literal application of Section 1092(a), a taxpayer who hedges only one of
her three shares may not deduct hedging losses before recognizing gain on all
138

See Keyes, supra note 3, at 17-3 (describing abuse that prompted
enactment of section 1092). The taxpayer thus is exploiting the timing option
discussed supra note 134.
139

Section 1092(a)(1). The straddle rules also prevent a taxpayer from
attaining the long-term capital gains holding period in her long, see Treas. Reg.
1.1092(b)–2T, and disallow interest incurred to purchase or carry a straddle. See
Section 263(g). These effects are discussed below.
140

A straddle is defined as “offsetting positions,” see Section 1092(c)(1),
which in turn means that one position “substantially diminish[es] risk of loss” in the
other. See Section 1092(c)(2). As a technical matter, the hedge arguably does not
reduce risk of “loss” in the option because “loss” is defined as a capital loss, see
Treas. Reg.1.1092(b)-5T (defining “loss” with reference to section 165), and
options generate ordinary rather than capital loss. Even so, the executive does
have risk of capital loss on the hedge, see supra note 133, which is diminished by
holding the option. Moreover, the definition of loss as capital loss purports to
apply only to certain regulatory provisions (i.e., Treas. Reg. 1.1092(b)–1T through
4T). Since the straddle definition is not among them, “loss” arguably is defined in
a nontechnical way for that purpose.
Some basket hedges may not give rise to straddles, though. Although the
option “substantially diminishes” risk of loss in a basket hedge that
disproportionately represents the employer’s stock, it may not do so for baskets
that tracks the industry or market as a whole. See Steinberg, supra note 59, at 243
n. 111 (single stock hedged with put based on broad based index could not be
straddle).
141

The executive might counter that losses are deferred only if she has
“unrealized gain,” see Section 1092(a)(1)(A), and options generate “income”
rather than “gain.” Yet such a technical reading of “gain,” though plausible, is
arguably inappropriate. Whereas regulations define “loss” as a capital loss, see
supra note 141, they do not offer an equivalent definition of gain.
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three shares.142 Although Congress authorized regulatory relief for this harsh
result almost two decades ago, the Treasury has not yet provided it.143 Arguably,
then, an executive cannot deduct hedging losses before retiring. Until then, she
will constantly receive new options and thus will always have appreciated longs.
To deflect this indefinite loss deferral, executives might argue that Treasury’s
eighteen-year delay entitles them to treat the statutorily-mandated regulatory relief
as self-executing.144 A recent IRS letter ruling supports this view, although such
rulings are of limited precedential value.145
142

Under section 1092(a)(1)(A), “Any loss with respect to one or more
positions shall be taken into account for any taxable year only to the extent that the
amount of such loss exceeds the unrecognized gain (if any) with respect to one or
more positions which were offsetting positions with respect to 1 or more positions
from which the loss arose.” As long as the two unhedged shares have
“unrecognized gain,” selling the hedged share arguably does not release the loss.
See Steinberg, supra note 59, at 246 (absent relief from the Treasury, “most
practitioners believe that the result [for unbalanced hedges] is that none of the loss
is currently deductible”).
143

See Section 1092(c)(2)(B) (“If 1 or more positions offset only a portion
of 1 or more other positions, the Secretary shall by regulations prescribe the
method for determining the portion of such other positions which is to be taken
into account for purposes of this section.”). See Priv. Let. Rul. 19925044 (1999)
(noting that such regulations have not been issued).
144

Although deductions are usually viewed as a privilege rather than a right,
see New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934) (deductions are a
“matter of legislative grace”), several authorities treat regulatory relief as selfexecuting when the statute mandates it (e.g. by using the phrase “the Secretary
shall,” as in Section 1092(c)(2)(B)) and the Treasury delays for an extended
period. See, e.g., First Chicago Corp. v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 180 (7th Cir.
1988) (in enacting minimum tax, Congress ordered Secretary to propose a tax
benefit rule; since Treasury had not “gotten around to” this task, court allowed
taxpayer to use tax benefit rule; note, though, that government conceded that tax
benefit rule was self-executing); see also, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 819 (1984) (”[T]he failure to promulgate the required
regulations can hardly render the new provisions of section 58(h) inoperative.”).
United States v. Deckelbaum, 784 F. Supp. 1206, 1207 n.3 (D. Md. 1992); Estate
of Maddox v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 228 (1989) (with respect to Section
2032A(g), which authorizes favorable estate tax valuation for certain family farms,
“[t]he Secretary cannot deprive a taxpayer of rights which Congress plainly
intended to confer simply by failing to promulgate the required regulations”).
145

See Priv. Let. Rul. 199925044 (1999) (allowing taxpayer who was
collaring less than all her stock to identify which stock was a straddle with her
(continued...)
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C. Tax Without Profit: Asymmetric Rates
Even an executive who expects to have ample capital gains and is willing to
be aggressive about straddle loss deferral is not out of the woods. An options
hedge still cannot leave her indifferent, after taxes, to subsequent changes in the
stock price. To do so, the hedge must produce a dollar of after-tax gain for every
dollar of after-tax loss on the option. In addition, it must produce a dollar of aftertax loss for every dollar of after-tax gain on the option. Yet, the hedge cannot
satisfy both of these conditions because different tax rates govern hedging losses
and gains. Since the option and hedge are a straddle, gain on the hedge is always
short-term capital gain, generating a 39.6 cent tax for every dollar of hedging
gain.146 In contrast, capital loss on the hedge will typically reduce long-term
capital gain, thereby reducing the tax bill by only 20 cents for every dollar of
hedging loss.147 These asymmetric rates force the executive to pick one of three
unappealing outcomes: a net after-tax loss as the stock rises; a net loss as it falls;
or a smaller net loss in both cases.148
1. Protection from Declines / Tax Cost from Increases
The cost of breaking even as the stock price falls is after-tax loss as the
stock price rises. For example, assume an executive has 10,000 options to buy a
share at $10. After the stock has appreciated to $100, she enters into a “collar” on
all 10,000 options, which leaves her exposed to price fluctuations between $90 and
145

(...continued)
collar, but noting that the ruling “may not be used or cited as precedent”).
146

A straddle leg cannot satisfy the long-term capital gains holding period
as long as it is part of a straddle, regardless of how long the taxpayer holds it. See
1.1092(b)-2T (holding period does not begin as long as property is part of a
straddle). Short-term capital gains rates are the same as those for ordinary income.
Cf. William A. Klein & Joseph Bankman, Federal Income Taxation 834 (11th Ed.
1997) (after netting, only long-term capital gain is subject to preferential rate).
147

The executive would avoid this problem if her losses were reducing other
short-term capital gains in her portfolio, since her losses then would reduce her tax
by 39.6 cents, instead of 20 cents. Yet an executive will rarely expect to have
sufficient short-term capital gains in the year her hedge matures, let alone shortterm gains that she would not otherwise have aged to long term.
148

Nor does the executive’s counterparty have correspondingly favorable
treatment (such as ordinary losses and long-term capital gains). Cf. Bradford,
supra note 104, at 731 (1995) (tax base is protected as long as favorable tax
treatment to one party is offset by unfavorable treatment to counterparty). The
counterparty would keep her usual treatment; if a dealer in securities, it would
have ordinary income or loss under mark-to-market accounting. See section 475.
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$110. The following table shows that, as the stock price declines below $90, every
after-tax dollar of option loss will be offset by an after-tax dollar of profit149 on her
collar.150
TABLE 5: BREAKING EVEN AS STOCK PRICE FALLS
Stock Price
at Maturity

Option Pretax Profit

Option
After-tax
Profit

Collar Pretax Profit

Collar
After-tax
Profit

Net Profit
on Both
Positions

90

800,000

483,200

0

0

483,200

60

500,000

302,000

300,000

181,200

483,200

10

0

0

800,000

483,200

483,200

Yet, for every dollar the price rises above $110, the executive loses 19.6 cents
after-taxes. The reason is that a dollar of pre-tax profit on the option is ordinary income
that generates a 39.6 cent tax; yet a corresponding dollar of capital loss on her collar
reduces the tax bill by only 20 cents.151
TABLE 6: 19.6% HEDGING TAX AS STOCK RISES 152

Maturity
Stock
Price

Option
Pre-tax
Profit

Option
After-tax
Profit

Collar
Pre-tax
Loss

Collar
After-tax
Loss

Net
After-tax
Profit

Compare
Profit at
110

149

She makes a profit on the collar as the price declines because the collar
allows her to sell the stock for $90. For example, if the stock is worth $60, the
right to sell it for $90 is worth $30.
150

A perfect offset is possible because the same tax rate applies to ordinary
income on the option and to short-term capital gains on the hedge. See supra note
147. For every dollar that the stock price falls below $90, the executive loses a
dollar of ordinary income per option (and 60.4 cents after taxes) and replaces it
with a dollar of short-term capital gain on her collar (and thus 60.4 cents after
taxes).
151

As indicated above, this calculation assumes the loss is reducing longterm, rather than short-term, capital gains. See supra note 148.
152

Another measure of hedging cost is the financial instrument an executive
must buy to break even as the stock price rises. She would need an additional
1,960 call options to earn an extra 19.6 cents after taxes for every dollar of
increase in the stock price above $110. (This calculation assumes she could use
existing capital losses to shelter tax on these new calls).
44

110

1,000,000

604,000

0

0

604,000

n/a

111

1,010,000

610,040

(10,000)

(8,000)

602,040

(1,960)

210

2 million

1,208,000

(1
million)

(800,000)

408,000

(196,000)

410

4 million

2,416,000

(3
million)

(2.4
million)

16,000

(588,000)

2. Exposure to Declines / No Net Cost from Increases
To avoid after-tax losses as the stock price rises, the executive can hedge
less than all of her position: 7550 options, instead of the full 10,000.153 Whereas
the hedge will still generate a tax cost as the stock price rises, appreciation in the
2,450 unhedged options offsets this cost. The price of breaking even, though, is
that 2,450 options remain unhedged. As Table 7 shows, they will generate aftertax loss as the stock price falls.
TABLE 7: INCOMPLETE PROTECTION FROM DECLINES

153

This number is computed as follows.

Let X = the number of hedged options
Let Y = the number of unhedged options
Since they both sum to 10,000, X + Y = 10,000
Since the after-tax return on the unhedged ones must offset the 19.6% cost on the
hedged ones,
.604Y = .196X
3.08Y = X
4.08Y = 10,000
Y = 2450
X = 1000-Y = 7550
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Maturity
Stock
Price

Option
Pre-tax
Profit

Option
After-tax
Profit

Collar
Pre-tax
Profit
(on 7550
Options)

Collar
After-tax
Profit

Net
Profit on
Both
Positions

Compare
Profit at
90

90

800,000

483,200

0

0

483,200

n/a

60

500,000

302,000

226,500

136,806

438,806

(44,394)

10

0

0

604,000

364,816

364,816

(118,384
)

Yet although the executive is incompletely protected as the price declines,
Table 8 shows that she now breaks even as the price rises.154
TABLE 8: BREAKING EVEN AS PRICE RISES
Stock
Price at
Maturity

Option
Pre-tax
Profit

Option
After-tax
Profit

Collar Pretax Loss
(on
7550
options)

Collar
After-tax
Loss (on
7550
options)

Net Aftertax Profit

110

1,000,000

604,000

0

0

604,000

111

1,010,000

610,040

(7550)

(6040)

604,000

210

2,000,000

1,208,000

(755,000)

(604,000)

604,000

410

4,000,000

2,416,000

(2.265
million)

(1.812
million)

604,000

3. Partial Exposure to Declines and Increases
Instead of having losses either as the price declines or as it rises, the
executive can spread her losses over both scenarios. For example, she can leave
1,225 options unhedged, instead of 2,450. As a result, she halves her losses as the
price falls below 90, at the cost of 9.8 cents for every dollar of increase above 110.

154

To break even as the price falls, the executive must buy puts that
generates 14.8 cents after taxes for every dollar of declines below 90. Assuming
this gain is taxable short-term capital gain (since her other positions do not
generate capital loss to shelter it), she will need 2,450 puts (i.e., 24.5 * 60.4 =
14.8).
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TABLE 8: LOSSES FROM DECLINES
Maturity
Stock
Price

Option
Pre-tax
Profit

Option
After-tax
Profit

Collar
Pre-tax
Profit
(on 8775
Options)

Collar
After-tax
Profit

Net
Profit on
Both
Positions

Compare
Profit at
90

90

800,000

483,200

0

0

483,200

n/a

60

500,000

302,000

263,250

159,003

461,003

(22,197)

10

0

0

702,000

424,008

424,008

(59,192)

TABLE 9: LOSSES FROM INCREASES
Maturity
Stock
Price

Option
Pre-tax
Profit

Option
After-tax
Profit

Collar
Pre-tax
Loss on
8775
Options

Collar
After-tax
Loss

Net
After-tax
Profit

Compare
Profit at
110

110

1,000,00
0

604,000

0

0

604,000

n/a

111

1,010,00
0

610,040

(8,775)

(7,020)

603,020

(980)

210

2 million

1,208
million

(877,500
)

(702,000
)

506,000

(98,000)

410

4 million

2,416
million

(2.6325
million)

(2.106
million)

310,000

(294,000
)

D. Planning Around Tax-Without-Profit Effects: Seeking Ordinary
Treatment on the Hedge
We have seen that the constructive sale rules and straddle loss deferral can
arguably be avoided. Yet the character mismatch and asymmetric tax rates are
more daunting. As we see in this Section, some planning opportunities almost
counteract them but, to my knowledge, none succeeds under current law. The
objective of each of these strategies is for the return on the hedge to be ordinary,
instead of capital. As a result, there no longer would be a mismatch with the
option’s ordinary return; likewise, differences between the short and long-term
capital gains rates would become irrelevant, as would the straddle rules’ effect on
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holding period. With the following six strategies, the hedge’s return would be
ordinary but other tax costs render the strategy unusable under current law.155
A cautionary note is in order, though. The tax law is constantly changing,
and tax lawyers are a creative group. As Professor Ginsburg has observed, “The
tax bar is a repository of the greatest ingenuity in America and, give them the
opportunity, they will do you in.” 156 Today’s tax barrier may be gone tomorrow.
1. Swaps

155

An alternative way of avoiding the character mismatch is -- not to make
the hedge’s character ordinary -- but to make the incentive compensation’s
character capital. There are only two instances when this occurs. The first, a socalled “section 83(b) election,” is not available for options. It is considered in Part
IV.D.2’s discussion of stock hedging.
The second type of incentive compensation that is capital is an incentive
stock option. See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing tax treatment of ISO’s).
However, hedging an ISO turns it into an NQO. For the option to qualify as an
ISO, the executive most hold it, and the stock acquired from exercising it, for a
requisite holding period without making a “disposition.” See Section 422(a)(1) (to
satisfy holding period, taxpayer must not make “disposition” until requisite time
has elapsed). In rulings, the government has construed “disposition” broadly to
include hedging. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-92, 1973-1 C.B. 208 (treating an
executive as making a disqualifying disposition by shorting stock while holding
identical stock acquired through a qualified option). Hedging would also eliminate
the holding period under the straddle rules. See Treas. Reg. 1.1092(b)–2T
(holding period does not begin as long as position is part of straddle). See also
Part IV.B.2 (discussing straddle rules). The executive cannot avoid these results
by holding the ISO for a minimum period before hedging; she still will not have
satisfied the holding period for the stock.
156

Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and
Acquisitions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the
House Comm. On Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (testimony of Martin D.
Ginsburg) (quoted in Erik M. Jensen, Aside: The Heroic Nature of Tax Lawyers,
140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 367, 372 (1991)).
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Although the tax character of swap157 payments is not settled, ordinary
treatment is likely for certain swaps.158 Yet hedging with swaps bears two severe
tax costs, each following from the fact that swap expenses are “miscellaneous
itemized deductions.”159 First, these losses are not deductible unless, together with
the executive’s other miscellaneous itemized deductions, they exceed 2% of her
adjusted gross income for the year.160 More importantly, ordinary swap losses
offer no deduction under the AMT.161 An executive with sizable options income,
offset by corresponding swap expenses, computes her AMT based only on the
income. As a result, she will owe a 28% tax on these amounts even when she has
no economic profit.162

157

A swap is a two party contract that binds each party to make periodic
payments based on an objective financial indicator, such as interest rates or stock
prices. For a description, see G-30 Report, supra note 4, at 8.
158

Ordinary treatment is more likely if the swap uses annual payments,
instead of a single payment at maturity, to account for gains and losses in the
underlying property. See Prv. Ltr. Rul. 9730007 (ordinary treatment for swaps
that settle gains and losses with periodic payments); see also New York State Bar
Association (Tax Section) Report on Notional Principal Contract Character and
Timing Issues, reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 22, 1998, at 15 [hereinafter
“NYSBA Swap Report”] (IRS ruling treating swap payments as ordinary may not
apply to swap using single payment at maturity). Yet use of annual payments has
two disadvantages. First, the executive may face a liquidity crunch. If the stock
price rises, she will owe a swap payment but may not have cash to pay it (since she
probably is not yet ready to exercise her option). In addition, the executive may
lose the advantages of tax deferral. If the stock price falls, the payment she
receives is immediately taxable.
159

These are a special class of disfavored itemized deductions, which are
not excluded from “miscellaneous” status by Section 67(b). The deduction under
Treas. Reg. 1.446-3 for swaps is usually considered an expense for the production
of income under section 212. Such expenses are not excluded by section 67(b).
160

See Steinberg, supra note 59, at 230 (swap expense subject to 2%
limitation). For example, if her a.g.i. is $250,000 and she makes a $50,000
payment, she loses $5,000 of the deduction.
161

See id; Section 56(b)(1) (disallowing deduction of miscellaneous
itemized deductions in computation of alternative minimum taxable income). For a
discussion of the AMT, see supra note 94.
162

See section 55(b)(1)(A)(is)(II) (tentative tax for noncorporate taxpayers
is 28% of so much as exceeds $175,000). Some of the executive’s hedge expense
will come due before she exercises the option (since the swap will require annual
(continued...)
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Yet this tax barrier largely depends on the AMT, which has come under
fire in recent months. Critics observe that the tax, which originally targeted
wealthy taxpayers, can now apply to large middle class families, merely because
they have many dependents.163 Not surprisingly, then, the House Republicans have
proposed to scale back and, ultimately, to repeal the AMT. The proposal, offered
by Chairman Archer of the Ways and Means Committee, would impose only 80%
of AMT liability in 2003, 70% in 2004, 60% in 2005, 50% in 2006 and 2007, and
would repeal the AMT entirely for tax years after 2007.164 If this measure survives
the vagaries of the budget process, hedging will no longer trigger a significant tax
without economic profit, at least after 2007.165

162

(...continued)
payments based on appreciation in the option). These swap deductions are likely
to reduce her taxable income enough to trigger the AMT. Thus, she could owe
AMT during every year that she hedges, and not just in the year she exercises her
option.
163

See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, The Crazy Politics of the Alternative Minimum
Tax, Tax Notes, March 22, 1999, at 1867.
164

See Jt. Comm. Tax’n., House Comm. on Ways and Means Description
of the Financial Freedom Act of 1999, at 9 (July 12, 1999) (proposing to reduce
individual AMT rates during 2001-07 and to eliminate it in 2007). The more
moderate proposal of Senator Roth, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, would
preserve the AMT but provide a full AMT deduction for personal exemptions.
See Jt. Comm. Tax’n, Senate Comm. on Finance Description of the Taxpayer
Refund Act of 1999, at 14 (July 20, 1999).
165

Before then, declines in the AMT rate could ease the tax cost, but
probably not enough to make hedging palatable. Even 50% of the AMT is a
significant tax to pay when the executive has no economic profit.
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2. Contingent Debt
The executive can generate ordinary hedging losses by embedding her
hedge in a debt instrument.166 She can borrow money and agree for her interest
obligation to increase with the employer’s stock price.167 Yet although interest on
contingent debt usually gives rise to an ordinary deduction,168 the so-called
investment interest rules severely limit the deduction. Far from targeting corporate
governance, this limitation aims at “tax arbitrage” in which taxpayers borrow
money (and deduct interest) to buy assets that yield a tax-exempt or a tax-deferred
return.169 In response, Congress allows a deduction of “investment interest” only
up to the amount of a taxpayer’s “investment income” (e.g., taxable interest and
dividends).170 On the equity-linked debt described above, then, the executive
cannot deduct interest (including payments based on appreciation in the underlying

166

Professor Knoll has observed this advantage of contingent debt as a
hedge for business risks. See Knoll, supra note 137, at 2.
167

For example, assume the employer’s stock is trading at $100 and the
executive has options to buy 10,000 shares at $10, which have $900,000 of
intrinsic value. She can buy a put which allows her to sell the stock for $90, so
that she locks in $800,000 of gain. To pay for this put, instead of selling a call (at,
say, $110), she can borrow money and structure her interest payments so that they
are, in effect, a short call. Thus she borrows $900,000 and, when the loan
matures, she must return this principal amount plus, as interest, the amount by
which the value of 10,000 shares exceeds $1.1 million. If the stock is trading at
$210 at maturity, she will owe $1 million of interest; but if the stock is trading at
$90, she will not owe any. Note that the put must be separate from the debt. If it
is embedded in the debt by allowing the principal amount to decline with the stock
price, the instrument may not qualify as debt for tax purposes — and thus will not
generate ordinary expense — since it does not require repayment of a minimum
amount.
168

Under the “noncontingent bond method” of Treas. Reg. 1.1275-4, this
interest is deductible, subject to the limitation described in text. The deduction is
not delayed until the executive makes the payment. Instead, she takes an annual
deduction based on her usual borrowing cost (the “comparable yield”). When the
debt instrument matures, she adjusts her income in that year (i.e., with inclusions
or additional deductions) to rectify any divergence between prior deductions and
her actual payment.
169

See Chirelstein, supra note 123, at 139 (explaining investment interest
rules as response to tax arbitrage).
170

See Section 163(d)(1) (investment interest may not be deducted to the
extent it exceeds net investment income). Disallowed deductions may be carried
forward to subsequent tax years. See Section 164(d)(2).
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stock’s value) except to the extent of her investment income. This amount does
not include her option gain, which is considered salary.171 As a result, the
executive may owe tax without having any profit, since her option income can be
matched by nondeductible investment interest.
Executives have a plausible argument to avoid this limitation, at least for
deductions claimed when the bond matures,172 but the “solution” creates a new
problem. The contingent debt rules treat expense at maturity (i.e., the so-called
positive adjustment) as a “loss,” at least for purposes of the straddle rules, if the
debt is part of a straddle.173 Does this regulation render the payment a “loss,” as
opposed to “interest,” for other purposes as well? If it does — and, in my view,
this reading is plausible, though not clearly correct — the positive adjustment is no
longer “interest” subject to the investment interest limits. However, as a “loss,” it

171

Salary income is not included in the two statutory classes of “investment
income”: “gross income from property held for investment” and “net gain
attributable to the disposition of property.” See Section 163(d)(4).
172

Specifically, the argument applies to the so-called “positive adjustment,”
which is an additional deduction for the amount by which the payment at maturity
exceeds the tax law’s prediction, as of the issue date, of what this payment would
be. See Treas. Reg. 1.1275-4(b)(6) (discussing positive and negative
adjustments). This predicted amount (the so-called “projected payment
schedule”), which is based on the issuer’s usual borrowing cost, has already been
deducted (i.e., through the issuer’s annual deduction for the “comparable yield”).
See note 169, supra (discussing use of comparable yield in noncontingent bond
method).
173

Treas. Reg. 1.1275-4(b)(9)(vi) ( “[A]n issuer treats a positive adjustment
as a loss with respect to a position in a straddle if the debt instrument is a position
in a straddle . . . .”)
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should be a miscellaneous itemized deduction174 that, as discussed above, is not
deductible under the AMT.175
3. Mark to Market Election for Securities Traders
If the executive can qualify as a “securities trader” under section 475(f),
she can elect ordinary treatment for all her securities including her hedge.176 Yet
even if she is eligible for the election,177 the strategy is too costly. All her other
174

Not all “losses” are miscellaneous itemized deductions. Indeed, losses
from “sale or exchange of property” are accorded favorable “above the line” status
(i.e., they are used to compute adjusted gross income). See Section 62(a)(3)
(granting deduction for losses from sale or exchange of property). Yet the loss
here is from terminating an obligation, not from selling property. Whereas section
1234A treats certain terminations as if they were a sale or exchange of property,
this provision explicitly excludes retirement of debt. See section 1234A (“The
preceding sentence shall not apply to the retirement of any debt instrument”).
Assuming the loss is not interest, no deduction would be available under section
163. See section 163 (authorizing deduction for interest). The statutory basis for
a deduction, then, is likely to be as an expense for production of income under
section 212. Yet such expenses clearly are miscellaneous itemized deductions.
See Treas. Reg. 1.67-1T(a)(1)(ii) (noting that expenses under section 212 are
miscellaneous itemized deductions).
175

See Part IV.D.1 (noting that executives cannot hedge with swaps
because swap expense is a miscellaneous itemized deduction that is nondeductible
under the AMT). Whereas deductions at maturity could thus be blocked by the
AMT, the “comparable yield” deduction which the executive might claim prior to
maturity is potentially limited by the straddle rules. If this interest is incurred to
“carry” a straddle, the deduction is disallowed; this interest is added to the basis of
a leg of the straddle. See Section 263(g)(1) (requiring capitalization of “interest
and carrying charges properly allocable to personal property which is part of a
straddle”). If added to the NQO’s basis, the interest expense reduces ordinary
income, thereby averting any character mismatch. If added to the basis of the put,
however, the expense generates capital loss and thus a mismatch.
176

See Treas. Reg. 1.475(f)–2(b).

177

To be eligible, the executive must have an active business of trading
securities in which she constantly places short-term bets. See Liang v.
Commissioner, 23 T.C. 1040 (1955) (traditional mark of a “trader” is that
“securities are bought and sold with reasonable frequency in an endeavor to catch
the swings in the daily market movements and profit thereby on a short-term
basis”); see also Daniel S. Shapiro, Private Securities Partnerships – The Trade or
Business Issue Reexamined, 56 Tax Notes 56 (July 6, 1992) (describing
(continued...)
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securities would be treated as ordinary property and marked to market, except
those plausibly identified as unrelated to the “trading business.”178 Thus she would
lose the advantages of deferral for all her appreciated assets, including her
compensatory option.179 This result is more tax-expensive than simply exercising
the option.
To mark only her hedge to market, and not other positions, the executive
might form a partnership that enters into the hedge and elects to mark its positions
to market.180 Yet this election is available only if securities trading is the
partnership’s “trade or business.”181 This status requires frequent short-term bets
as opposed to one long-term short position on one stock.182 Even if the “trader”
election were available, moreover, the passive loss rules generally would prevent
partnership hedging losses from offsetting the executive’s “active” option
income.183

177

(...continued)
requirements in case law for having a trade or business as a securities trader). This
showing is difficult for someone who has a full-time occupation unrelated to such
trading.
178

See Treas. Reg. 1.475(f)-2(a)(4) (securities not identified as investment
securities are marked to market and ordinary income treatment).
179

Since she would want mark to market treatment for her hedge (in order
to get ordinary character), the executive would have to settle for mark to market
treatment for the option. See 1.475(f)–2 (securities that are substantially similar
generally must be marked to market if at least one has been treated a “trading”
security).
180

The partnership, as opposed to the partners, elects the partnership’s
method of accounting, but the choice “shall not apply to any partner’s
nonpartnership interests.” See 1.703-1(b). Thus, a Section 475(f) election, if
successful, gives the executive mark-to-market and ordinary treatment on any
positions in the partnership (i.e., the hedge) but not on any of the positions outside
the partnership.
181

See Section 475(f) (offering election to “a person who is engaged in a
trade or business as a trader in securities”).
182

To seem more like a trader, the partnership might supplement the hedge
with other positions, but this defeats the purpose of using the partnership (i.e.,
avoiding mark to market accounting for other positions).
183

The passive loss rules keep taxpayers from reducing their wage income
with “passive losses,” i.e. losses from activities in which they do not “materially
(continued...)
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4. Physically-Settled Derivative
The character mismatch and asymmetric rates arise because the hedge
generates losses that, after taxes, may not fully offset option gains.184 These
effects do not arise, though, if the hedge — instead of generating a corresponding
loss — simply caps the executive’s taxable income from the option. For tax
purposes, physically-settled derivatives are treated as fixing a sale price, and thus
capping the amount realized on the underlying property.185 For example, assume a
taxpayer has an option to buy 10,000 shares for $10. When the underlying stock is
at $100, such that the NQO has $900,000 of intrinsic value, the executive might
enter into a contract to sell the compensatory option itself (a “physically-settled
forward contract”) for $900,000 in three years.186 Upon delivering the option, the
executive has $900,000 of taxable option income, even if the option is worth
considerably more. To use this approach, however, the executive must actually
deliver her NQOs, a legal impossibility because they are not transferable.187
5. Hedging Rules

183

(...continued)
participate.” See Section 469(a); see generally Joseph Bankman, The Case
Against Passive Investments: A Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions,
42 Stan. L. Rev. 15 (1989) (describing passive loss rules). Limited partners are
presumed not to be material participants. Section 469(h)(2). In any event, the
executive is unlikely to “participate materially” in implementation of the hedge.
Executives might eventually use the losses upon selling the partnership interest, but
only if the sale is to an unrelated third party. See Section 469(g). Assuming (as is
likely) that an investment bank is the executive’s partner, the executive cannot sell
her interest to the bank or the partnership. See Section 469(g)(1)(B). Given the
limited demand for such a partnership interest, the executive probably cannot
count on such a sale to release losses.
184

See Part IV.B & C, supra.

185

See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 59, at 222 (when put option is physically
settled, no gain or loss is recognized on the put; gain or loss is recognized on
underlying property, based on put exercise price instead of underlying’s fair market
value); cf. id. at 248 n. 125 (noting that taxpayers can use physically-settled
derivatives to avoid “converting” long-term gain to short-term gain on straddle).
186

Although I use $900,000 in text for the sake of simplicity, the price
should be higher because forward prices generally equal the spot price plus an
amount based on time value.
187

See Part II.A, supra.
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The hedging regulations of Treas. Reg. 1.1221-2 alleviate character
mismatches in other contexts, such as hedging of inventory.188 If applicable, the
regulations allow ordinary treatment for hedging losses that otherwise would be
capital.189 Yet regulatory relief is unlikely here. It is available only for “hedging
transactions,” defined as “a transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal
course of the taxpayer’s trade or business primarily . . . to reduce risk of price
changes or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property . . that is held
or to be held by the taxpayer.”190 Even if the executive is hedging “price changes,”
a phrase that seems more applicable to inventory or raw materials than to equity
compensation,191 she is not hedging “in the normal course of [her] trade or
business.” Whipple v. Commissioner192 concludes that “full time service to one
corporation does not alone amount to a trade or business.” Nor is the hedging
itself “in the normal course.” It obviously is not a work responsibility, since it is
not even in the employer’s interest.
6. Hedge Provided by Employer
If the employer supplies the hedge as compensation, the hedge yields an
ordinary return193 and thus does not trigger loss deferral or asymmetric tax rates.

188

For a discussion of the problem that inspired the regulations, see Edward
D. Kleinbard & Suzanne Greenberg, Business Hedging After Arkansas Best, 43
Tax L. Rev. 393 (1988).
189

See Treas. Reg. 1.1221-2(a).

190

Treas. Reg. 1.1221–2(b)(1).

191

Nor is it clear that the option is “ordinary property.” Although it yields
ordinary income, See 1.1221-2(c)(5)(is) (“[P]roperty is ordinary property to a
taxpayer only if a sale or exchange of the property by the taxpayer could not
produce capital gain or loss . . . ..”), an NQO that has no readily ascertainable fair
market value arguably is not “property” for tax purposes until it is exercised. For
this argument, see infra note [83(b) election].
192

373 U.S. 193 (1963). Whipple might be distinguished as applicable
“[w]hen the only return is that of an investor,” since Mr. Whipple was a major
investor in the firm. In contrast, the typical executive’s primary relation to the firm
is as an employee, not as an investor.
193

See Section 83(a) (providing ordinary character for property received as
salary). The firm might be reluctant to provide loss protection explicitly (e.g.,
through a put) because doing so could render the compensation nondeductible.
See supra note 100. Yet the firm could avoid this issue by offering “performance”
pay based on an easily attainable target (such as a low level of accounting
(continued...)
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Yet such a hedge does not raise the same concerns as third-party hedges. As a
party to the negotiation, the firm can monitor and protect its interests and also will
disclose the hedge to shareholders.
E. Hedging Stock
The tax penalties on options hedging generally still apply if an executive
hedges a grant of stock received as compensation (so-called restricted stock).
These penalties apply with much less force, however, if an executive seeks to
hedge stock purchased stock with her own funds, whether in exercising an option,
in a market purchase or, say, in founding the firm.
1. Stock Purchased with Executive’s Own Funds
Assume an executive purchased a share of stock for $1 of her own funds.
Once the stock has appreciated to $100, she decides to hedge it. Of the tax
penalties on options hedging discussed above, the only one that applies with the
same force to here is the constructive sale rule and, as indicated above, that rule is
easily avoided. For instance, the executive could enter into a “collar” in which she
retained risk of loss from $100 to $90 and opportunity for gain from $100 to $115.

In this circumstance, the capital loss limitation has no application because,
unlike the return on an NQO, the return on stock is capital. Because gains on the
stock have the same character as losses on the hedge, the two offset each other for
tax purposes.194
In addition, the straddle rules could apply to stock hedging. Yet unlike
options hedging, stock hedging offers a way to avoid the two adverse
consequences of this regime, discussed above: indefinite deferral of hedging

193

(...continued)
earnings).
194

For instance, if the stock rose to $215, the executive would have $115 of
capital gain to absorb the $100 capital loss on the cash-settled collar.
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losses195 and the asymmetric rate effect.196 Specifically, a physically settled hedge
(i.e., in which the hedged asset is actually delivered in satisfaction of the hedge)
avoids these problems.197 Whereas this structure cannot be used for options (i.e.,
because contractual restrictions prevent it from being transferred), no such
constraint operates on stock (i.e., since it usually can be delivered).
As a result, the tax barriers for stock hedging are fairly modest, as long as
the stock was purchased with the executive’s own funds. Since stock hedging
presents somewhat less serious governance issues than options hedging, as
discussed above, this differential is not necessarily troubling. To the extent
195

To see this effect, assume the executive had two shares of stock, each
bought for $1, and hedged only one of them (i.e., with a $90-$115 collar). If the
stock rose to $215 and the executive settled the collar by paying $100 to her
counterparty – that is, through cash settlement – she arguably could not use this
capital loss until she sold both shares of stock. For a discussion of this issue, see
supra Part IV.B.2.
196

To see this effect, assume the executive had only one share of stock,
purchased for $1, and hedged it with a $90-$115 collar. If the stock declined to
$20, she could receive a cash payment of $70 upon cash-settling the collar. This
capital gain is short-term – regardless of how long she has held the collar or stock
– because the collar and stock are a straddle. This gain in effect replaces a
corresponding $70 decline in the built-in capital gain on the stock (since it declined
from $90 to $20). If the executive held the stock for more than a year before
hedging it, this built-in capital gain would have been long term if she had sold the
stock instead of hedging it. As a result, if the collar is cash settled, long-term
capital gain on the stock is replaced with less-desirable short-term gain on the
collar.
197

For a discussion of why physically-settled derivatives avoid loss deferral
and asymmetric tax rates, see Part IV.D.4. In general, unlike a cash-settled
derivative, which the tax system treats as having tax consequences separate from
the hedged asset – that is, separate losses (potentially subject to deferral) or
separate gains (potentially rendered short-term) – physically-settled derivatives do
not have tax consequences separate from those on the hedged asset. Instead, the
physically-settled derivative merely set the amount of gain on the hedged asset.
In the examples in the preceding footnotes, then, if the stock rises to $215
and the executive physically-settles the derivative, she is treated as selling the stock
at $115, and thus has a gain of $114 (i.e., $115 minus $1) – instead of a gain of
$214 and a separate $100 loss on the collar, as she would have if the collar were
cash-settled. Likewise, if the stock falls to $20 and she physically-settles the
collar, she is treated as selling the stock at $90, and thus has a gain of $89 (i.e.,
$90 minus $1) – instead of a gain of $19 on the stock and a (short-term) gain of
$70 on the collar, as she would have if the collar were cash-settled.
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shareholders want to restrict stock hedging, however, they cannot rely on the tax
law for this function.198
2. Restricted Stock Grants
Although the tax constraints on stock hedging usually are modest, they are
severe – indeed, almost as severe as on options hedging – if the executive received
the stock as salary, instead of purchasing it with her own funds. Such stock
hedging resembles options hedging for two reasons. First, like the return on an
unexercised NQO (and unlike the return on stock generally), the return on a
restricted stock grant is ordinary income.199 As a result, if an executive hedges the
stock before it vests, stock appreciation would be ordinary but hedging losses
would be capital, thereby implicating the capital loss limitations. Second, as with
an option (and unlike with stock generally), there may be limitations preventing
transfer or sale of the restricted stock; thus, the hedge may have to be cash-settled,
and so the straddle rules could trigger loss deferral and asymmetric rates, as
discussed above.200
A way around these constraints -- though not a cost-free one-- is available
for restricted stock, but not options. Through a so-called section 83(b) election,
executives can choose to treat the value of certain property, received as
compensation, as ordinary income when they receive it. Any subsequent
198

For instance, a problem arguably arises when boards ease the
requirements for exercise, apparently to encourage executives to own more stock.
In so-called “reload” options, the firm gives executives new at-the-money options
when they exercise in order to restore some of the time value lost upon exercise.
See Gay, supra note 65, at R6 (describing reload options); see also Steven
Huddart, et al., Valuing the Reload Features of Executive Stock Options, NBER
Working Paper 7020 (1999) (describing reload options and methods of valuing
them). Some of these options also have “tax reload” features in which new
options replace stock that is sold to pay taxes. Id. at R7 (describing tax reload
feature). In effect, the firm deliberately undoes the lock-in described above. See
Part III, supra. A problem with such options, not widely recognized, is that they
replace hard-to-hedge options with easy-to-hedge stock.
199

Under Section 83, such stock also generates ordinary income, in an
amount equal to the stock’s fair market value on the vesting date.
200

On the other hand, if relevant contracts permit the executive to sell the
restricted stock after it vests, the executive might structure a physically-settled
hedge with a term longer than the vesting period. Then, adverse tax consequences
could largely be avoided, including the capital loss limitations (since the hedge
would serve to cap the sale price, instead of generating separate losses that could
be subject to deferral). Whereas the constructive sale rule would still apply, the
taxpayer could avoid it through, for example, a physically-settled collar.
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appreciation is treated as capital gain201 and so hedging the property does not
trigger a character mismatch. Because the election is available for stock but not
for a typical NQO,202 stock grants are easier to hedge than NQOs.203 Even when
available, though, the section 83(b) election comes at a cost. Not only must the
executive forgo deferral (i.e., by including the property’s value in income in the
year she receives it), but she gets no deduction if she forfeits the stock (e.g., upon
leaving her job).204
F. Scope, Accidental Origins, and Fragility of Tax Barrier to Hedging
In three ways, the tax barrier to options hedging is more effective than
existing contract and securities law barriers.205 First, the tax barrier applies at firms
that do not limit hedging by contract. Second, the tax barrier affects all U.S.
executives, and not just the most senior ones (as do most securities law barriers).
Third, the tax barrier applies to basket hedges that evade other barriers.206
Yet Congress did not craft the tax barrier as a corporate governance
measure. Instead it arose by accident, from the interaction of several tax
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See Raasch & Rowland, supra note 92, at 40 (describing consequences
of Section 83(b) election).
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The reason is that an 83(b) election is available only for “transfers of
property.” See Treas. Reg. 1.83-2 (“property [must be] transferred (within the
meaning of 1.83-3(a))”). Grant of an option that does not have readily
ascertainable value is not considered a “transfer of property.” See Treas. Reg.
1.83-3(a)(2) (noting that “the grant of an option to purchase property does not
constitute a transfer of such property” and cross-referencing 1.83-7 for “the extent
to which the grant of the option itself is subject to section 83"); See Treas. Reg.
1.83-7(a) (option that does not have readily ascertainable fair market value is not
subject to section 83 until it is exercised).
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Another disadvantage of stock grants is that they may reinforce the
executive’s reluctance to involve the firm in risky projects. See Part I.C.5.
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See Section 83(b) (“[I]f such property is subsequently forfeited, no
deduction shall be allowed in respect of such forfeiture”); see also Treas. Reg.
1.83-2(a) (same). Any deduction that is still permitted, such as upon selling the
stock at a loss, is a less desirable capital loss. This prospect is not of concern to
someone who is hedging, though. She is content as long as both the hedge and
hedged asset generate gains and losses that can offset each other for tax purposes.
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See supra Part II for a discussion of these other barriers.
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Application of the straddle rule barriers (i.e., loss deferral and
asymmetric tax rates) to basket hedges is less clear, though. See supra note ?.
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objectives: preventing exploitation of the timing option (e.g., the constructive sale
rule, straddle rules and capital loss limitations), blocking tax arbitrage (investment
interest rules), and shoring up the system as a whole (passive loss rules, AMT).
Indeed, no one seems to have intended to tax options hedging more punitively than
stock hedging.207 Like the tax barrier to exercise, the tax barrier to options
hedging traces from LoBue. If the dissent had prevailed, options would be taxed
as ordinary income when granted. Because the subsequent return would be
capital, hedging would not trigger a character mismatch. Yet we can be sure the
Court did not anticipate this effect of its decision.
Given these accidental origins, it is not surprising that the tax barrier has a
gap, albeit a hard one to exploit. Whereas the tax barrier creates chilling ex ante
risks in all cases, some costs (i.e., from the capital loss limitations, straddle rules,
and asymmetric tax rates) arise only if the stock price increases after the executive
hedges.208 Even so, risk neutral executives should be deterred because these
potential costs as the stock rises are not offset by potential after-tax benefits as the
stock price falls. For risk averse executives, moreover, the bad outcome is
deterrent enough. Nor can executives usually predict a decline in the stock price
with certainty. A rational executive will not drive down the stock price merely to
break even on her hedge, since the reputational costs of “success” can be careerending. In addition, an executive cannot legally use inside information.209
Although she may have advantages in assessing public information, it is hard to be
certain the stock price will fall in absolute terms,210 since even poor performers
drift upward in a rising market.211
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See Part IV.E, supra (noting relative ease of hedging stock).
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To avoid most (but not all) of the tax risks, the executive can pay for a
put by giving the counterparty cash, instead of a call option. However, people are
rarely willing to buy such protection with cash because it is so expensive. See
supra Part I.B.
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Firm trading policies, discussed supra note 70, also impede use of inside
information by preventing executives from trading except immediately after
periodic disclosure.
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Indeed, an executive’s predictive powers may be fairly unreliable. In a
recent survey, Smartmoney.com noted that, over a twenty-four week period in
which the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose by 9%, the 92 companies in which
insiders had increased their holdings declined by 2.7%; the 227 firms in which
insiders reduced their holdings were up 16.8%. “The Clueless Insiders,”
Smartmoney.com, February 11, 1999.
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The tax risk also generates two second order effects. By thinning the
ranks of executives who would be interested in hedging, it may discourage
(continued...)
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Whereas the tax barrier is effective for now, at least in the United States, a
vulnerability is that, as an accidental barrier, it can be unsettled as inadvertently as
it fell into place. For example, the asymmetric-tax-rate effect arises only if
different tax rates govern ordinary income and long-term capital gain – something
that was not true as recently as 1986, and that may cease to be true in the future
(e.g., if the Democrats regain control of Congress while retaining the White
House).212 Likewise, a June 1999 IRS ruling has made the deferral of straddle
losses considerably less formidable.213 More fundamentally, executives will be able
to hedge with swaps if the AMT is repealed, as Chairman Archer has proposed,214
or if swap expenses become deductible under the AMT. The latter change, a more
modest one, is also reasonably likely in light of the tax bar’s ongoing debate about
the tax rules for swaps.215 In more general terms, the political currents that can
alter the relevant tax laws – or, for that matter, keep them in place – spring from
sources broader than, and, indeed, far removed from, corporate governance. This
can be a strength, in that executives cannot capture the process. Yet it is also a
weakness. If the tax law changes in response to unrelated pressures and concerns,
a likely prospect in my opinion, the tax barrier will be gone. In the coming years,
then, other barriers will be needed. As we see in the next Part, the other barriers
already in place in the United States are not sufficient.
Even today, moreover, the tax barrier does not affect executives who are
not subject to U.S. tax (e.g., because they are not U.S. citizens and their work
does not have sufficient nexus to the U.S. economy).216 This problem takes on
particular urgency because option grants outside the United States are becoming
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investment bankers from marketing these products. From the executive’s
perspective, moreover, the tax risk creates a signaling cost. If hedging is plausible
only for those who expect declines, it becomes all the more embarrassing if
detected.
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I have written elsewhere about the instability of the capital gains
preference. See Schizer, supra note 102, at 1579-82, 1592-93, 1601-06.
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See supra Part IV.B.2.
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See supra Part IV.D.1.
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See generally NYSBA Swap Report, supra note 159.
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U.S. citizens and resident aliens are subject to tax on their worldwide
income, regardless of where it is earned. Treas. Reg. 1.1-1(b); Joel D. Kuntz &
Robert J. Peroni, 1 U.S. International Taxation B1-50 (1992). In contrast,
foreigners generally are taxed on salary income only if it is “effectively connected”
to the United States. Section 871(b). 2 Kuntz & Peroni, supra note216 , at C1-75.
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increasingly common.217 In many cases, foreign firms seek to imitate U.S.
compensation practices; without the tax barrier, though, a key piece of the puzzle
is missing. While tax and regulatory barriers to hedging in other jurisdictions are
beyond this Article’s scope, they should be scrutinized. If they are ineffective, as I
suspect they may be, contractual or regulatory responses are urgently needed when
this U.S. compensation trend is exported.
V. DESIRABILITY OF A TAX SOLUTION
As discussed in Part I, shareholders have a strong interest in preventing
executives from hedging. Likewise, executives should want to signal credibly that
they are not hedging in order to earn extra compensation for taking risk. If the tax
barrier is repealed, then, both parties will have incentive to limit options hedging
another way. In my view, it would be better for contract or the securities laws,
instead of the tax law, to bar options hedging. Even so, the tax barrier is a
reasonably satisfactory solution in the United States, at least as long as it is not
repealed inadvertently.
A. Administrative Costs
Since Professor Surrey’s influential work,218 the costs of pursuing social
policy through tax have been well understood. Yet some of these costs are absent
here, for a somewhat atypical reason: the U.S. tax system already monitors and
punishes options hedging for reasons unrelated to corporate governance (e.g.,
backstopping the realization rule, avoiding valuation disputes, etc.).219 The added
administrative cost is modest when society “subcontracts” this corporate
governance task to the tax system.220 Because no new tax rules must be added,
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See supra note 20.
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See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concepts of
Tax Expenditures 35-39 (1973) (proposing direct expenditure programs as
alternative to tax expenditures).
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Because this fortuitous condition might not hold in other jurisdictions,
this advantage of the U.S. tax barrier might be difficult to replicate elsewhere. See
Part VII.C., infra.
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Cf. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 973 (1986) (“Tax incentives
efficiently communicate government policies through an existing information
network, that is, the network of professional advice and assistance that exists to
comply with the tax law.”) The added administrative cost attributable to the tax
barrier to exercise is also modest, since it also already exists for tax-administration
reasons. A difference, though, is that this barrier is easier to duplicate without the
(continued...)
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policing this practice does not add to the Code’s complexity. Nor does it increase
compliance costs. Executives must already keep records, file returns, hire tax
advisors, etc.221 The government, likewise, already is supposed to monitor this
compliance.222
Without the tax barrier, firms (or perhaps the SEC) would have to tighten
existing contractual and securities law limits on options hedging.223 Although
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(...continued)
tax system (e.g., through penalties for early exercise or rewards for longer holding
periods). As the option counterparty, the firm has the power to block exercise but
not hedging, since the latter is a transaction with third parties.
221

Executives are likely to comply because of tax rules that gather
information and penalize fraud. For example, the investment bank usually must
report to the IRS the payments they make to executives on a hedge. See Section
6041(a). Likewise, employers must report an executive’s salary (including
options) to the government and withhold a portion as tax. Id. If the executive
violates the law (e.g., by not treating the option and hedge as a straddle), she faces
steep financial penalties and even criminal prosecution. Indeed, there is even a
specific penalty for failing to comply with disclosure requirements under the
straddle rules. See Section 1092(a)(3)(B). Admittedly, though, IRS enforcement
activities are reported to have waned in recent months (a symptom, apparently, of
the IRS’s waning political standing). See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Tax
Professionals See Pitfalls in New I.R.S., N.Y. Times, July 18, 1999, at 21 (“[I]n
the agency’s zeal to be friendly . . . tax enforcement has shriveled.”). Yet the
extent of the decline is disputed. See George Guttman, The Interplay of
Enforcement and Voluntary Compliance,” 83 Tax Notes Today 1683 (June 21
1999) (“[I]t is unclear whether the decrease in enforcement action is as
pronounced as some claim”). In any event, executives probably will still hesitate
before violating the tax law, not only because their tax preparers should refuse to
sign their return, but also because their high incomes increase their risk of being
audited (and, arguably, the reputational cost of being caught).
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Although the theory here is that the U.S. government is merely pursuing
its usual revenue raising objectives, without any interest in minimizing agency
costs, the two objectives are related. If stock prices rise, the government generally
shares in those gains by taxing shareholders; if it falls, the government generally
shares in the loss. Likewise, the government loses revenue when executives
substitute the nontaxable psychic benefits of shirking or perquisites for taxable
NQO gains.
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I’m assuming the tax system continues to impose approximately the same
administrative costs, so that the institution-building costs incurred by the executive
and firm are not offset. Overall administrative costs of the two systems in
(continued...)
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attainable, the goal imposes costs. It is harder than restricting sale or exercise,
because hedging does not require the firm’s participation and thus is hard to
detect, absent disclosure.224 To require disclosure, the firm (or SEC) must define
hedging. This task is not easy, since hedging can take various forms with new
ones constantly being developed. Narrow definitions are easy to evade, while
broad ones (e.g., which include basket hedges) will be resisted as infringing on an
executive’s privacy in making investments unrelated to the firm. Either way,
executives will need legal advice about how to comply, in addition to the tax
advice they already are procuring. Likewise, firms (and/or the SEC) will have to
hire employees to monitor compliance. Especially if enforced by the firm (rather
than the SEC), the regime could impose morale costs. Executives may resent
disclosing to the board personal information unrelated to the firm, even though
they are used to disclosing to the IRS. For boards, it may be easier to have the tax
system prevent hedging, instead of taking on the “bad cop” role themselves.
B. Transition Problems
Shareholders would not act to limit options hedging more effectively until
they realized that hedging otherwise was likely to occur. Similarly, executives
would have little incentive to agree to better options hedging restrictions (or to
suggest them) until the reputational sanctions for hedging exceeded the benefits.
Yet the over the counter derivatives market is a recent creation whose implications
for hedging have not been equally evident to everyone. Executives have an
informational edge, since investment banks have an incentive to educate them and
to keep the education discreet225 -- a goal facilitated by porous disclosure
obligations. In this climate of imperfect information, then, a great deal of options
hedging might have occurred in the United States, if not for the tax barrier.226
Eventually, media coverage might have triggered lemon pricing, as well as better
contractual and regulatory responses. Even then, options hedging could have
continued during the transition, while the SEC, boards, and executives debated the
proper response.
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combination, therefore, would rise.
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See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 101 (noting that “derivatives markets
facilitate anonymous trading” and that “the enforcement problem [associated with
insider trading] is considerably more difficult when the trading occurs in
derivatives than when it occurs in the stock market”).
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Investment bankers could expect fees from the hedge, as well as from
work which grateful executives could provide (e.g., securities offerings, etc.).
226

Indeed, it is possible that such hedging is now occurring outside the
United States. The practice’s inherent secrecy makes data hard to find.
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C. Uniformity vs. Nuance
Contractual solutions are more nuanced than government interventions.
For example, the tax barrier penalizes “good” basket hedges along with “bad”
ones,227 a consequence that some shareholders and executives might not choose
when contracting. Indeed, off-the-rack government interventions may discourage
private parties from developing better solutions. More generally, executives are
not equally risk averse and do not have uniform preferences, and so a single
solution is unlikely to maximize utility in all cases.228
Even so, a uniform ban is less daunting here because substitutes for options
hedging remain available. Instead of allowing executives to hedge with third
parties, the firm itself can supply a hedge or otherwise adjust the executive’s pay.
These steps do not trigger the tax barrier to hedging, and they impose fewer
transactions costs and are more transparent than third-party hedging.229
A uniform ban does have an advantage, moreover. Without one,
shareholders may find it expensive to “price” the diverse restrictions that could
arise.230 Shareholders presumably know that an executive’s incentive is to stop the
appearance, but not necessarily the reality, of hedging. They also should know
that only careful observers can distinguish “real” and “staged” anti-hedging
policies. One must scrutinize details of the firm’s basket-hedging policy, such as
227

In defense of the tax barrier, though, its penalty for “bad” ones is more
severe than for “good” ones, because only the former would be a straddle – with
attendant risk of loss deferral and asymmetric rates. See supra note ?. Yet the
capital loss limitations still apply, even to “good” basket hedges.
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Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 103 (“One-size-fits-all is as bad in the
corporate governance market as in the clothing market.”). Relatedly, there are
efficiencies (and perhaps appealing distributional effects) when parties to a
contract internalize the costs of implementing it. Yet this concern is less
compelling here because, as discussed above, the marginal cost to the tax system
of penalizing hedging is low.
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See supra Part IV.D.6 (hedge provided by employer does not trigger tax
barrier); Part I.C.2 (transparency and transaction cost advantages of renegotiating
with firm). As indicated above, use of puts and noncontingent cash payments
could render compensation nondeductible; yet the firm could avoid this issue with
nominally performance-based cash bonuses or indexed options, albeit at the cost of
less favorable accounting. See Part IV.D.6.
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See John C. Coffee, The Mandatory / Enabling Balance in Corporate
Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1679 (1989) (“Put
simply, standardization of contract terms through the use of mandatory legal rules
reduces information costs for investors.”).
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the minimum tracking error it requires and the vigor of the board’s enforcement
efforts.231 The game might not be worth the candle, since any single shareholder
would not capture all benefits of monitoring. Instead, rationally ignorant
shareholders might assume an average level of hedging at all firms; firms and
executives would find it difficult, then, to signal credibly that executives were not
hedging.232 This problem is less likely, though, if the hedging ban and enforcement
mechanism are uniform. Understanding one regime is cheaper than scouring
variations for hidden loopholes.233
D. Institutional Mission: Expertise and Stability
If the government must intervene (e.g., to head off the vicious cycle
described above), the securities laws is a better vehicle than the tax law. Although
the tax law has a potential administrative cost advantage, described above, the
SEC has the offsetting advantage of greater corporate governance expertise.
Indeed, the tax system has a poor track record, at least on corporate governance
steps it has taken deliberately.234 Moreover, the tax barrier has the disadvantage of
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Sometimes boards enforce policies only as needed to avoid adverse
publicity. For example, at the insistence of institutional investors, many boards
require managers to purchase stock with their own funds. Yet the Wall Street
Journal reports that these programs often are public relations charades. Id. For
example, some firms lend executives the purchase price and then forgive the loan.
Id. (citing examples of Baxter International Inc. and Eastman Kodak Co.). The
guidelines are seldom enforced. “I would fall over backwards,” one compensation
consultant said, “ if the company fired someone for not meeting guidelines.” Id.
(quoting Carol Bowie, director of publications at Executive Compensation
Advisory Services, a Virginia compensation consultant).
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See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 1523 (describing as a “special case of
the market for lemons” the problem when potential investors are unsure whether a
firm’s structural rules are unduly favorable to management). To minimize this
problem, boards could ban any position whose value varies inversely with the
stock price, while retaining the sole right to grant exceptions and pledging to
disclose these exceptions. Yet even under this strict approach, shareholders might
not trust the board’s monitoring.
233

Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1566 (1989) (“[W]ith mandatory terms, the investor is on
equal footing with the firm, because the investor can spread the cost of
understanding charter terms across all firms considered for investment.”).
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See supra Part II.A. (noting flaws in ISO rules and section 162(m)); see
also sources cited in note 13, supra.
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applying only to executives who are subject to U.S. tax. Finally, as discussed
above, seemingly unrelated changes in the tax law could undo the tax barrier.235
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Universal Contractual Prohibitions
Given the tax barrier’s overbreadth and instability, as well as its limited
effect outside the United States, all firms should have contractual prohibitions.
These should govern all executives who receive options, rather than just senior
officers (as often is the case among firms that currently have such policies). Firms
should restrict hedging at least as much as exercise236 and should punish offenders
(e.g., by revoking option grants). A broad definition of hedging is warranted to
address abusive basket hedging.237
Disclosure of hedging should be required of all executives who are not
subject to U.S. tax and, particularly if the U.S. tax law changes, of U.S. taxpayers
as well. Unlike current law, the disclosure obligation should not be limited to the
most senior executives, and it should include basket hedges. A question is whether
firms should introduce comprehensive monitoring and disclosure efforts for U.S.
taxpayers when the tax barrier is still in effect. Some firms may wish to rely
exclusively on the monitoring supplied by the tax system, so their contractual
prohibitions would be enforced largely through moral suasion. Yet firms with
monitoring and disclosure already in effect for other purpose, such as insider
trading, may conclude that the incremental cost (e.g., of monitoring basket hedges)
is justified.
B. Securities Laws238
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See supra Part IV.F; Part IV.B.2 (discussing straddle losses); Part
IV.D.1 (discussing swaps and AMT)
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In my view, firms should restrict hedging more severely than exercise.
Exercise triggers the firm’s tax deduction, but hedging does not. Moreover,
exercise is discouraged by noncontractual constraints that may not apply to
hedging, such as loss of time value and reputational sanctions.
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Firms might distinguish the abusive and nonabusive varieties through
tracking error or the extent of the firm’s representation in the basket.
Alternatively, some firms may prefer to ban all basket hedging, while offering
indexed options to those who want them.
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Although this discussion refers explicitly to U.S. securities law,
corresponding adjustments should be made in other jurisdictions.
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Section 16(c) should be expanded to govern basket hedges, or at least
abusive ones, with a test based on tracking error or representation. In addition,
the SEC should continue to read the rule to bar options hedging, even if it
abandons this view for hedges of other derivative positions (such as convertible
preferred).239 The SEC should broaden the rule beyond insiders, so it applies to all
executives who hold options.
In addition, disclosure obligations for insiders should apply to basket
hedges, including nonabusive ones, so shareholders can make their own judgment
about the hedge. Finally, the group of executives who must disclose arguably
should be expanded beyond insiders, for example, to include those who have
options on more than a minimum number of shares.
C. Tax and Accounting Preferences
In the United States, cash compensation is an expense for accounting
purposes but, to the extent it exceeds $1 million, it is not deductible for tax
purposes.240 In contrast, options do not trigger an accounting expense241 but are
tax-deductible. Both the tax and the accounting policy have been justified as a
way to encourage firms to use options.242 To the extent that it ever makes sense to
distinguish cash compensation from options,243 the distinction makes no sense if
executives are able, through hedging, to transform the latter into the former.
These preferences should either be repealed or confined to firms that have banned
hedging.244
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See supra note 85, noting that the SEC has offered section 16(c) relief in
certain instances without offering a rationale.
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See Section 162(m). For a discussion, see infra Part III.A.
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See supra Part I.C.2.
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For incentive justifications of section 162(m), see Bank, supra note 7,
12; see also infra Part III.A. In 1995, FASB tried to require financial report of
options expense. Yet after a flurry of lobbying and Senate hearings, FASB backed
down, settling for the footnote disclosure described above. Foes of disclosure
warned about difficulties in valuing the options, but the principal argument was
that use would discourage firms from using them.
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For critiques of the tax incentive, see, e.g., Stabile, supra note 13, at 95;
Alexandri, supra note 13. For critiques of the accounting treatment, see Jack T.
Ciesielski, Stock Options: Accounting Issues Related to a “Shadow Currency,”
Analyst’s Accounting Observer, May 22, 1998, at 1-21; McConnell, supra note 48
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As noted above, a reason to repeal the accounting preference is that it
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. Executive Stock Options
In revealing the difficulty of options hedging in the United States, this
Article confirms the relevance of debates about the proper structure of options
packages. This Article also reveals an advantage, not previously understood, of
motivating executives through options instead of stock ownership.245 As we have
seen, the tax law makes it much more difficult to hedge NQOs than stock.246
Indeed, stock ownership may not motivate executives, absent effective disclosure
and contractual limits on hedging. For the same reason, recent empirical studies
measuring the effect of stock price fluctuations on CEO wealth are more reliable to
the extent that they consider NQOs rather than stock holdings.247
B. Derivatives
There is a more general lesson here about derivatives. Institutional detail
matters profoundly. Many have observed the derivatives market’s potential to
change the tax system, the capital markets, and, indeed, the economy as a whole. I
agree with this prediction. Derivatives are already changing our economic lives.
Yet in assessing their impact, we must consider the tax and other legal regimes
244

(...continued)
does not reach, and thus disfavors, market-adjusted options. The tax barrier to
hedging compounds this problem by preventing executives from synthesizing these
options (i.e., with genuine basket hedges). All the more reason, in my view, to
repeal the accounting preference.
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Others have already observed the superior risk effects of options. See,
e.g., Tufano, supra note 56, at 1097; see also Part I.C.5, supra.
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To be precise, the key distinction for tax purposes is whether the
property was received as compensation or was purchased with the executive’s own
money. Thus, grants of stock as salary are difficult to hedge, whereas stock
purchased by the executive (including through exercise of a compensatory option)
is not. Rule 16-c(4), in contrast, distinguishes between options and stock –
regardless of how they were acquired. Under Rule 16-c(4), the former are harder
for insiders to hedge than the latter.
247

See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOS Really Paid
Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q. J. Econ. 653 (1998) (concluding that the sensitivity of
CEO wealth to fluctuations in stock prices is greater than previously recognized,
but not considering effects of hedging). For measures of the stock ownership, the
executive’s obligation since 1994 to disclose single stock hedges is helpful but the
absence of disclosure on baskets represents a potentially significant gap. See also
supra note 78 (commercial services do not report hedging to market).
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governing them. Although these regimes are obscure and often highly technical,
the careful student can reap rich rewards because the devil (or, in our case, the
angel) is in the details.
C. Comparative Corporate Governance
In the United States, effective use of options depends in part on the tax law
since, for now, it fills gaps in contractual and securities law barriers. Yet it is
improbable that tax laws in other jurisdictions already serve this function, since the
U.S. tax barrier arose by accident and accidents will not necessarily recur
elsewhere.248 Without a hedging barrier, though, use of options is not advisable.
Once again, we see that governance practices are creatures of law and culture, as
well as economics.249 One jurisdiction’s practices may not be appropriate for
others, at least without thoughtful adaptation.
D. Tax Law and Corporate Governance
Scholars have identified numerous instances in which the tax law impedes
effective corporate governance or, at least, pursues corporate governance
objectives ineffectively.250 Yet the U.S. tax law’s impact is more balanced than
scholars previously have recognized. As this Article shows, by helping tether
executives to their stock options, the tax law enhances corporate governance.251
Perhaps contract or the securities law could limit hedging more durably and
flexibly, although the tax law has an administrative cost advantage they do not
share. Yet contract and the securities laws are not performing this function now,
at least not comprehensively. Thus, the tax law deserves a healthy share of the
credit. There may be similar stories yet to be told. In my view, the impact of tax
on corporate governance merits further study. It has been under-explored, I
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Other jurisdictions do face some of the problems that prompted the tax
barrier, such as the need to backstop a realization requirement. Yet other tax
rules, such as the capital / ordinary distinction and the AMT, are considerably less
common.
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See, e.g., Ronald Gilson & Mark Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor
Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
508-540 (1999) (human capital investments by Japanese firms flow from cultural
barriers to labor mobility, rather than promises of lifetime employment; the latter
practice, without the former, would not increase such investment in U.S.).
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See note 13, supra.
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As noted in Part I.C.2, the tax law’s contribution is greatest if options
provide beneficial incentives, but remains constructive (i.e., by promoting
transparency) even if options provide suboptimal incentives.
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suspect, because tax experts seldom think about corporate governance, and
corporate experts seldom think about tax.
The effect described here, moreover, illustrates the enormous power of the
tax law to influence behavior, sometimes for the worse but, in this case, mostly for
the better. Since the pathbreaking work of Professor Surrey, scholars have
understood the costs of deploying the tax law in this way. Yet in this case, the tax
law has proved a plausible way to pursue the relevant policy objective. The key
fact here is that the tax law has its own reasons to monitor and penalize particular
behavior, and so the added burden on tax administration is modest. It is worth
exploring whether this advantage recurs elsewhere.
More generally, we should recognize the profound influence of our tax
laws. Their effects ripple throughout the economy, sometimes in ways no one
intended and few recognize. We should approach changes in the tax system,
especially fundamental one, with humility. Some collateral consequences will be
good. Others will not. The only certainty, it seems to me, is that we will not
anticipate them all.
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